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

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NARRATIVE

OF

THE BURMESE WAR.

NARRATIVE

OF

THE BURMESE WAR,

IN

1824—26,

AS ORIGINALLY COMPILED FROM OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

With a Map.

By

HORACE HAYMAN WILSON,

M.A., F.R.S., &c.,

PROFESSOR OF SANSCRIT IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD.

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W. LEWIS AND SON, PRINTERS, FINCH LANE, CORNHILL.

TO THE

Right Honourable Earl Amherst,

UNDER WHOSE AUSPICES

THE DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE

BURMESE WAR

WERE ORIGINALLY COMPILED AND PUBLISHED,

THIS REPETITION OF THE

NARRATIVE

IS INSCRIBED AS A MARK

OF THE UNDIMINISHED RESPECT OF

THE COMPILER.

in a quarto volume, entitled "Documents Illustrative of the Burmese War." The duty of collecting and editing the documents was entrusted by the government to me, and I was permitted to prefix to them a short connected narrative of the incidents of the war. It is this narrative which is now offered to the public, under an impression, that in the present doubtful aspect of our relations with the Burman kingdom, some interest and utility may attach to a record of the former collision.

H. H. WILSON.

LONDON,
May 8th, 1852.

NARRATIVE

OF THE

BURMESE WAR

IN THE YEARS 1824—1826.

THE occurence of hostilities with the neighbouring kingdom of Ava, was an event which was not unforeseen by the British government of India, as the probable consequence of the victorious career and the extravagant pretensions of the Burman state.

Animated by the reaction which suddenly elevated the Burmas from a subjugated and humiliated people into conquerors and sovereigns, the era of their ambition may be dated from the recovery of their political independence; and their liberation from the temporary yoke of the Peguers, as the prelude to their conquest of all the surrounding realms. The vigorous despotism of the ernment, and the confident courage of the

PREFACE.

THE war with the Burmas in 1824-26, was attended with so many circumstances of a novel and peculiar character, and opened to European access so many new and interesting regions, that it was thought advisable by the Government of Bengal, to place before the public in a collective and available form, a series of official documents, illustrative of the origin, course and termination of hostilities: providing in this manner a trustworthy guide for any future emergency of a similar nature, and disseminating authentic information respecting the valuable countries between India and China, of which at the time little or nothing was known. With these views two sets of papers were selected, the one political and military, the other topographical and statistical, and both were printed in Calcutta, in 1827,

and either found an asylum in the district of Chittagong, or secreted themselves amongst the hills and thickets, and alluvial islands along its southern and eastern boundaries: from these haunts they occasionally sallied, and inflicted upon the Burmas in Arakan, a feeble retaliation for the injuries they had sustained; retiring to their fastnesses when their purpose was effected, or when encountered by superior force. In general their efforts were insignificant, and their incursions were rather predatory than political; but in 1811, a more formidable invasion took place, and the fugitives having collected under the command of Khyen-bran,[4] a Mug chief, attempted an aggression of a serious character. They were joined by many of the Mugs from Chittagong, and being aided by those still resident in Arakan they soon overran that province and recovered the whole of it from the Burmas. Their success was transient. Reinforcements arrived from Ava. Khyen-bran was defeated and his followers were put to the rout, and the insurgents were compelled to return to their hiding places on the frontiers of Chittagong. Although every exertion was made by the police of Chittagong, aided by the military to prevent all assemblages of armed men in the

district, and to disperse them as soon as formed, the nature of the country and the general devotion of the Mug population to the cause of Khyen-bran rendered every measure of but limited efficacy, whilst the issue of the insurgents in such numbers from the Company's territory, under the command of an individual who had resided many years under the protection of the local authorities, did certainly afford reason to the court of Ava to suspect that the incursions were instigated and supported by the British government. In order to efface this impression, letters were addressed to the raja of Arakan, and viceroy of Pegu, and Captain Canning was sent on a mission to Ava, to offer every necessary explanation. These advances were unsuccessful, and the envoy, after experiencing much indignity at Rangoon, and incurring some personal peril, was recalled to Bengal, without communicating with the capital. As long as the chiefs of the insurgents were at large, the Burman government declined all amicable communication. They insisted upon the seizure of the obnoxious individuals, and their delivery by the British officers, or threatened to overrun the district of Chittagong, with a force more than sufficient for their apprehension. This menace

was frustrated by the presence of a body of troops, but due attention was paid to the just claims of the Burman government, and parties were dispatched against the fugitives, and rewards offered for their capture. Khyen-bran escaped, but several of his chief followers were secured. Common humanity forbade their being resigned to the barbarity of the Burmas, and the refusal to deliver them was a source of deep and long cherished resentment to the court of Ava. After a few years of a precarious and fugitive life, during which, deserted by his followers and straitened by the vigilance with which his movements were watched by both British and Burmas, Khyen-bran was deprived of the means of doing mischief, that chieftain died, and left the court of Ava no cause of complaint against the government of British India.[5]

The death of Khyen-bran, the dispersion of his adherents, and the confinement of the principal leaders, produced a favourable change in the state of the country, and divested such disturbances as subsequently occurred of all national or political importance. The insurgents generally manifested a disposition to return quietly to their homes, but a few, unable to resume at

once habits of tranquil industry, continued to lurk in the hills and jungles of Chittagong, under the command of Ryngjang, a chief of Khyen-bran's party, who continued at large. At first, his band did not consist of more than thirty followers, but it gradually increased to about a hundred, and with these he committed some predatory excesses, but solely upon the subjects of the British government; being impelled to this conduct by the terror of a prison and the want of food. The depredations of this chief and his adherents were speedily checked by the activity of the magistrate, and in May 1816, were finally suppressed by the surrender of the chief. Their existence, however, furnished the court of Ava with no additional ground of complaint, as they were restricted to the territories of the Company.

The perfect immunity of the Burman frontier from aggression for a period of two years, and the repeated assurances of the British government of India that, as far as depended upon their officers, this desirable state of things should be perpetuated, might have satisfied the government of Ava of the sincerity of the pledge, and justified the expectation that amicable relations would be permanently formed.

The second year, however, of the restoration of tranquillity on the confines of the two states had not quite expired, when the demand for the surrender of the Mug refugees was renewed by the son of the raja of Ramree, the governor of Arakan, who brought a letter from his father to that effect. The magistrate of Chittagong was directed to reply to the letter of the raja but the Governor General, the Marquis of Hastings, thought it advisable to address a letter to the viceroy of Pegu, in which it was stated, for the purpose of being communicated to the king of Ava, that "the British government could not, without a violation of the principles of justice, deliver up those who had sought its protection; that the existing tranquillity and the improbable renewal of any disturbances rendered the demand particularly unseasonable; and that whilst the vigilance of the British officers should be directed to prevent and punish any enterprize against the province of Arakan, it could lead to no advantageous result to either state to agitate the question of the delivery of the insurgents any further." No notice was ever taken of this letter, and the silence of the court of Ava, for some time afterwards, confirmed the government of

Bengal in the belief, that "there was not the least reason to suspect the existence or the future contemplation of any hostile design on the part of the Burmese government;" in consequence of which impression, the government countermanded "the extraordinary preparations of defence against the Burmese, which had been adopted upon the general tenor of the intelligence obtained after the receipt of the communication from Ramree, the knowledge possessed by government of the arrogant spirit of the court of Ava, and the extreme jealousy which it had always entertained of the protection granted by the British authorities to the emigrant Mugs."[6]

The impression thus entertained was by no means justified by the result, and after the expiration of another twelvemonth, a second letter was received from the raja of Ramree, making a demand, on the part of the king of Ava, for the cession of Ramoo, Chittagong, Moorshedabad, and Dacca, on the alleged ground of their being ancient dependencies of the kingdom of Arakan which was now annexed to the Burman dominions, and filled with extravagant and absurd menaces in the event of a refusal to comply with the requisition. A letter in reply was written to

the viceroy of Pegu, treating this demand as the unauthorised act of the raja of Ramree, and stating that "if the Governor General could suppose it to have been dictated by the king of Ava, the British government would be justified in considering it as a declaration of war." The letter from the Raja it may be observed, was never disavowed, and the demands it conveyed, as well as the tone in which they were expressed, could not have emanated from a subordinate officer, if he had not been previously armed with the full authority of the Court. Nor, in fact, was the demand altogether new, although now for the first time directly urged. The claim was repeatedly advanced both in public and private, as far back as 1810, when Captian Cox was at Amerapura, and it must even then have been familiar to the dispositions of the administration.[7] It was therefore not the unauthorised impertinence of a provincial governor, but the expression of sentiments long entertained by the government of Ava, and presently, as we shall observe, explicitly avowed by other and more important of its functionaries. Had not the attention of the government of India been diverted to more emergent considera[illegible] in other quarters, there is no doubt

that a satisfactory explanation of so extraordinary a procedure would have been insisted on, or that the alternative would, as intimated by Lord Hastings, have then been war.

The successful termination of hostilities in central India was, perhaps, one cause of the subsequent silence of the Burmese government, but other reasons may be found in the death of the king of Ava, who expired in 1819; in the arrangements consequent upon the succession of the reigning prince, the active interference of the court of Ava in the politics of Asam, and the reduction of that country to its authority.

The constitution of Asam comprised even to a greater extent than usual with Asiatic governments, the seeds of civil dissension. Although the government was hereditary in the same family, the choice of a successor rested with the king, or the great council, or the persons of most authority in the state. These were also, for the greater part, hereditary, not only as to rank, but function, and the son of a minister ordinarily succeeded to his father's post. The chief ministers were three in number, the barputra gohain, the bara gohain, and the boora gohain; next to these was the bar barua, or great secretary, and then came

the phokuns and baruas, who filled the different public offices of the state, and were mostly supposed to have descended from the original companions of the founders of the ruling dynasty; in consequence of which they were entitled to the influence and authority they enjoyed.

Amidst these individuals, jealousy and intrigue were always busy, and the annals of Asam present a singular picture of intestine discord. It was, however, between the rajas and the gohains that the principal struggle prevailed, in which the boora gohain had acquired an irresistible ascendency, and, subsequently to the year 1796, usurped the sovereign authority, the raja being a mere cypher in his hands.

Upon the death of raja Kamaleswar, in 1810, his brother, Chandra Kant, was raised by Purnanand, the boora gohain, to the throne; but the new raja soon became impatient of the control of a servant, and encouraged his adherents to enter into a conspiracy against his minister. The plot was, however, discovered: the raja was obliged to disavow all participation in it, and his adherents were put to death with the most horrible cruelty. The bara phokun, who was one of the conspirators, made good his escape

to Calcutta, where he applied, on behalf of his master to the British government. Meeting with but little encouragement in that quarter, he had recourse to the Burman envoys then at the Presidency, and accompanying them on their return to Ava, immediately procured military succours. 6000 Burmas, and 8000 auxiliaries accompanied him to Asam, where the boora gohain had breathed his last two days before their arrival. The son of that minister, who succeeded to his father's station and ambition, retreated to Gohati on the approach of the Burmas, leaving the raja at Jorhath to welcome their arrival, and reward the activity of the bara phokun, by making him his minister. The Burmas were reimbursed their expenses, and dismissed with honour, and a female of the royal family was sent with valuable presents to Amerapura.

The services of the bara phokun were unable to protect him against the effects of court intrigue and the bara barua and bara gohain influenced Chandra Kant to put him treacherously to death, on which his friends and kindred fled to Ava. In the meantime the son of the late boora gohain, inheriting his father's resentment against the reigning raja, invited a prince of the royal family,

throne, were joined by considerable reinforcements from Ava, under Mengyee Maha Bandoola, an officer of rank and military ability. Chandra Kant was defeated at Mahagar-ghat in an action in which he displayed great personal bravery, and was compelled to seek safety once more in flight. He refrained from retiring to the Company's territories, but the Burman commander, anticipating that he would take that direction, addressed a letter and a message to the officer commanding on the frontier, stating, that although it was his wish to remain on friendly terms with the Company, and to respect the British authorities, yet, should protection be given to Chandra Kant, he had received orders to follow him wherever he might go, and to take him by force out of the British dominions. Although it was not thought likely that these menaces would be enforced, yet orders were, in consequence, sent to the magistrate, that should Chandra Kant or any of his party appear within his district, they should be disarmed and sent to a distance, and measures were taken to strengthen the force on the frontier. In the meantime, a general feeling of insecurity prevailed amongst the inhabitants of Rungpore; and on various oc-

casions, parties of Burmas crossing the river, committed serious devastations within the British territory, burning a number of villages, and plundering and murdering the inhabitants, or carrying them off as slaves. These proceedings, when complained of, were disavowed, but no redress was obtained.

The pretence of maintaining the lawful prince in possession of his throne was soon abandoned by the Burmas, and a chief of their own nation was appointed to the supreme authority in Asam. The vicinity of a powerful and ambitious neighbour was therefore substituted for a feeble and distracted state; and this proximity was the more a subject of reasonable apprehension, as, from the country being intersected by numerous rivers, and from the Burmas being equally prepared to combat by water as by land, it was at any time in their power to invade and plunder the British provinces, without its being possible to offer effective opposition, or to intercept their retreat, under the existing constitution of our defensive force. It was also to be anticipated, from the known pretensions of the Burmas, and the spirit they had invariably displayed, that it would not be long before they found some excuse

throne, were joined ...s which, chiefly ments from Ava, u... British govern- an officer of rank ...a for the injuries Kant was defeat... ...ll suffered to sub- in which he d... ... This anticipation and was comp... ...sland in the Brahma- flight. He r... ...h flag had been erected, pany's territ... ...Burmas, the flag thrown anticipating ...force collected to maintain addressed ...not appear that this conduct command... ...but sickness weakening the though ... ...Asam, and the rising of some of terms ... ...engrossing their attention, they British ... ...time from their unwarrantable en- given ... They were, however, likely to re- to fo... ...whenever the opportunity was con- take ... ...a sense of insecurity could not fail Ah... ...ertained by the authorities in Asam, me... ...actual occurrence of war relieved the ...usion by the certainty of danger.



The threatening attitude of the Burmas, at ...extremity of the frontier, now rendered it ...cumbent on the British government to advert ...the position which they likewise occupied in ...central portion, and to take such mea- ...ere at once practicable for the defence

of the eastern provinces. With this view they determined to accede to a requisition that had been some time under their consideration, and to take the principality of Kachar under British protection, by which arrangement they were enabled to occupy the principal passes into the low lands of Sylhet, and thus effectively oppose the advance of the Burmas from the district of Manipur, which they had some short time previously reduced to their authority.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century, Manipur, a principality lying on the east of Kachar, and interposed between it and the provinces of the Burman monarchy, engaged in successful hostilities with the latter, and even occupied the capital. Family dissensions enfeebled the power of the principality, and Alompra avenged the disgrace which the Burmas had suffered by invading and devastating Manipur. In his distress the raja had recourse to Bengal, and in 1762 a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, was concluded between him and Mr. Verelst, in consequence of which six companies of sipahis were dispatched to his assistance, with the declared purpose of not only clearing Manipur of the enemy, but of subjugating the kingdom

of the Burmas. The advance of the division was retarded by heavy rains, and its numbers were so much reduced by sickness, that it was recalled long before it had traversed Kachar. An attempt was made in the following year to renew the negotiation, but the difficulties of the enterprise were better understood, and the application was declined. The last raja, Jay Sing, who died about 1799, left several sons, of whom the eldest, Harsha Chandra, succeeded. After a few years, he was put to death by the brother of one of his father's wives, but this chief was speedily slain by Madhu Chandra, the second son of the late raja. He was killed, after a reign of four or five years by his brother Chourjit, who then became raja. Of the remaining brothers, Marjit fled to the court of Ava, and Gambhir Singh continued in Manipur. After repeated alternations of reconciliation and animosity, Marjit, having obtained a strong Burman force, invaded Manipur about 1812, and succeeded in dispossessing his elder brother, and compelling him to fly. Chourjit took refuge first in Kachar, and subsequently in Jyntea. The youngest brother, Gambhir Singh, after residing with Marjit for a twelvemonth, found it also expedient to leave the principality,

and he entered into the service of Govinda Chandra, the raja of Kachar, by whom he was invested with the command of his troops. In 1817, the new sovereign of Manipur invaded the neighbouring state of Kachar, on which the raja fled into Sylhet, and solicited the aid of the British government, offering to hold his country under an acknowledgment of dependency. As these offers were declined, he had recourse to the brothers of the raja of Manipur, and invited Chourjit from Jyntea, promising to divide with him and Gambhir Singh, the territory of Kachar, as the price of their services. The succour of the two brothers, and the exertions of his own adherents, proved effectual, and Marjit was compelled to withdraw to Manipur. The allies of the Kachar prince were eventually equally detrimental to his interests, and Chourjit and Gambhir Singh uniting their forces against Govinda Chandra, expelled him in 1820, from Kachar, and divided the country between them. Govinda Chandra again took refuge in the Company's territories. Some time afterwards, probably after the death of the king of Ava, Marjit was summoned to Amerapura, and declining to comply with the summons, a powerful Burman

force was sent against him, which drove him from the country, and annexed Manipur to the Burman empire, connecting and concentrating its conquests in this direction. Marjit was received by his brothers in Kachar, with kindness, and a portion of their principality was assigned to him. The harmony did not last long, and Chourjit and Gambhir Singh disagreeing, the former was defeated and fled into the Company's territories. On this occasion, Chourjit tendered his interest in Kachar to the Company. The Burmas taking advantage of these dissensions, now prepared to invade Kachar, on which both Marjit and Gambhir Singh hastened to invoke the support of the British government of India, and for the reasons above referred to, it was determined that Kachar, should be taken under the protection of the Company. The same protection was extended upon his request, to the raja of Jyntea. Notwithstanding the intimation of these determinations to the Burmas, they persisted in their purpose of invading Kachar, and thereby provoked the commencement of actual hostilities in that quarter, as will be hereafter noticed: in the meantime, the discussions on the side of Chittagong had assumed a decided tone, and left the question of peace or

war between the two states no longer a subject of speculation.

The insolence of the Burma authorities in Arakan and the adjacent countries, had not been restricted to the extravagant menaces which have been noticed. Repeated instances of actual aggression had still more distinctly marked either their intention of provoking hostilities, or their indifference as to their occurrence. The chief objects of these acts of violence were the elephant hunters in the Company's employ, whom the Burmas seized, and carried off repeatedly, under the pretext that they were within the territories of the king of Ava; a pretext that had never been urged throughout the long series of years, during which the Company's hunters had followed the chase in the jungles and hills of the eastern frontier. In May 1821, the Burmas carried off from the party employed in the Ramoo hills, the Darogah, the Jemadar, and twenty-three of their men, on whom they inflicted personal severities, and then threw them into confinement at Mungdoo, demanding from the prisoners a considerable sum for their ransom.

In the following season, or February 1822, the outrage was reiterated; the party employed at

the Keddah, was attacked by an armed force, dispersed, and six of the hunters were carried off to Arakan, where they were thrown into prison. and threatened with death, unless they paid a heavy ransom. The place whence these people were carried off was, undoubtedly, within the Company's territory, being considerably to the west of the Morasi rivulet, which, in 1794, had been acknowledged by the Burmas to separate the two states. Urgent applications were made therefore, to the raja of Arakan, to release the unfortunate captives, and a representation on the subject was made to the court of Ava, but no notice was taken of either application. Several of the people, after experiencing much ill usage, were released, but some died in captivity. The object of the Burmas was evidently to establish themselves by intimidation, upon the hilly and jungly tracts, which were calculated to afford them a ready and unexpected entrance into the level and cultivated portions of Chittagong.

The same system of violence was adopted in another part of the Chittagong district, in order to maintain pretensions to territorial jurisdiction equally unfounded with those made upon the elephant grounds of Ramoo, in order establish

the right of the Burmas to the whole extent of the Naf river, which, like all those along the coast, rises at no great distance inland, and flows by a narrow stream, until it approaches the sea, when it suddenly expands into an estuary more than a mile broad. The Burmas claimed the right of levying a toll upon all boats entering the mouth of the river, although upon the British side; and on one occasion, in January 1823, a boat laden with rice having entered the river on the west or British side of the channel, was challenged by an armed Burman boat, which demanded duty. As the demand was unprecedented, the Mugs, who were British subjects, demurred payment, on which the Burmas fired upon them, killed the manjhee, or steersman, and then retired. This outrage was followed by reports of the assemblage of armed men on the Burman side of the river, for the purpose of destroying the villages on the British territory, and in order to provide against such a contingency, as well as to prevent the repetition of any aggression upon the boats trafficking on the Company's side of the river, the military guard at Tek Naf, or the mouth of the Naf, was strengthened from twenty to fifty men, of whom a few were posted on the adjoining

island of Shahpuri; a small islet or sand bank, at the mouth of the river on the British side, and only separated from the mainland by a narrow channel which was fordable at low water.

The determination thus shown by the British authorities to maintain the integrity of their frontier was immediately resented by the Burmas, and the Mungdoo Ucherung, or police officer, to whom the conduct of these transactions was committed by the viceroy of Arakan, was urgent with the magistrate of Chittagong to withdraw the guard, asserting the right of the king of Ava to the island, and intimating his having authority from the viceroy to declare, that if the detachment was not immediately recalled, the consequence would be a war between the two countries.

The raja of Arakan was therefore addressed on the subject, who replied by reiterating the demand for the concession of Shahpuri. In answer to his demand, the right of the Company was asserted, but at the same time a disposition to investigate the claim in a deliberate and friendly manner was expressed, and a proposal was made, that Commissioners on the part of either government should be deputed in the ensuing cold season, to meet and determine all questions respecting the dis-

puted territory on the borders. Before this reply could have reached the raja, however, he proceeded to carry his threat of applying force into execution, under the express orders, as was carefully promulgated, of his sovereign the king of Ava. A body of one thousand Burmas, under the raja of Ramree, landed on Shahpuri, on the night of the 24th September, attacked the British post and killed three, and wounded four, of the sipahees stationed there, and drove the rest off the island. The Burmas then returned to the main land.

The act was reported to the Bengal government in a menacing letter from the raja of Arakan himself, stating that, unless the British government submitted quietly to this treatment, it would be followed by the like forcible seizure of the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad.

Notwithstanding the assertions of the Burmas that the island of Shahpuri had belonged to their government, the earliest records of the Chittagong jurisdiction showed that it had been always included in the British province, that it had been surveyed and measured by British officers, at different periods from 1801 to 1819, and that it had been repeatedly, although not uninter-

ruptedly, held by Mug individuals, under deeds from the collector's office ever since 1780. It lay on the British side of the main channel of the Naf, and the stream which separated it from the Chittagong shore was fordable at low water. With these facts in its favour, however, the British government invariably expressed its readiness to investigate the subject in a friendly manner; which offer being met by the forcible eruption of the Burmas, placed them under the necessity of upholding their character, as well as vindicating their rights.

It was not the value of the island of Shahpuri, which was in fact of little worth, being of small extent and affording only pasturage for cattle, that was in dispute: the reputation of the British government and the security of their subjects enjoined the line of conduct to be adopted, and in fact the mere possession of Shahpuri was clearly not the object of the Burman court. The island was avowedly claimed upon the very same pretext as the provinces of Chittagong, Dacca, and Moorshedabad, and its abandonment would have been an encouragement of other and more serious demands. It was, therefore, no more than prudent to make a stand at once in this

quarter, with the view of deterring the Burmese from the further prosecution of those encroachments, which they evidently projected.

In order, however, to avoid till the last possible moment, the necessity of hostilities, the government of Bengal, although determined to assert their just pretensions, resolved to afford to the court of Ava an opportunity of avoiding any collision. With this intent, they resolved to consider the forcible occupation of Shahpuri, as the act of the local authorities alone, and addressed a declaration to the Burman government recapitulating the past occurrences, and calling upon the court of Ava to disavow its officers in Arakan. The declaration was forwarded by ship to Rangoon with a letter addressed to the viceroy of Pegu. The tone of this dispatch was that of firmness, though of moderation, but when rendered into the Burmese language, it may, probably, have failed to convey the resolved and conciliatory spirit by which it was dictated, as subsequent information of the most authentic character established the fact of its having been misunderstood as a pusillanimous attempt to deprecate the resentment of the Burmese, and it was triumphantly appealed to at the court

of Ava as a proof that the British government of India was reluctant to enter upon the contest, because it was conscious of possessing neither courage nor resources to engage in it with any prospect of success: it had no other effect, therefore, than that of confirming the court of Ava in their confident expectation of re-annexing the eastern provinces of Bengal to the empire, if not of expelling the English from India altogether.[8]

In the meantime, the island in dispute was re-occupied. Two companies of the 20th regiment, which had been forwarded from Calcutta, were landed on Shahpuri on the 21st November, and stockaded on the island; no opposition was offered, nor did any Burmas appear. A proclamation was distributed at the same time, stating that the only object of the detachment was the re-occupation of the island, and that the intercourse of the people on the frontier should suffer no interruption from their presence. The force left on the spot was two companies of the 2nd battalion 20th regiment native infantry, and two field pieces, six pounders, on the stockade at Shahpuri; one company at Tek Naf; and the *Planet*, armed vessel, and three gun-boats,

each carrying a twelve-pounder carronade, were stationed in the Naf.

Although no resistance was offered to the occupation of the island, yet, a variety of concurrent reports, and the unreserved declaration of the Burmese officers with whom communications were entertained, made it evident that the result would be a war between the two states. Certain information also that the Burmas were collecting troops both in Asam and Arakan, and menaced an attack upon the different exposed points of the Company's frontier, rendered it necessary that the Bengal government should look to the occurrence of hostilities as an impending contingency. Under this impression the correspondence that had taken place was referred to the Commander-in-chief, Sir Edward Paget, who during the greater part of the time had been absent on his military tour in the upper provinces. His excellency was also requested to take the subject into his consideration and provide as he might think most advisable for the defence of the frontier, as well as for the system of offensive operations that might be expedient, should war between the two states become inevitable.

In reply to this communication the Commander-in-chief suggested that for the defence of the eastern frontier, three brigades should be formed, to consist of three thousand men each, to be stationed at Chittagong, Jumulpore, and Goalpara, and a strong corps of reserve to be posted under a senior commanding officer in Dinagepore, to which all communications should be made, and from whence all orders should be issued. His excellency also urged the formation of an efficient flotilla on the Brahmapootra, towards Asam, and in the vicinity of Dacca. The course of operations on the frontier he recommended should be strictly defensive, or at the utmost limited to the re-establishment of the states subdued by the Burmese; while the offensive system, which was likely to be the only effectual mode of punishing the insolence of the Burmas, was an attack by sea on such points of their coast as should offer the best prospect of success. In a subsequent despatch, in reply to a further communication from the supreme government, his excellency declared his conviction that the conduct of the Burmas had rendered hostilities inevitable; and reported the dispositions which had been made for the defence of the eastern

frontier; and the views adopted by the members of government at the presidency, being thus confirmed by the sentiments of the Commander-in-chief, arrangements were adopted for carrying on the war upon the principles in which he had concurred.

In the end of October, information was received by the commissioner of the north east frontier, that the Burmas were concentrating their troops in Asam for a military expedition, which in the first instance was intended for Kachar, and, according to general report, eventually against the British territories. Instructions were sent to the commissioner to lose no time in apprising the Burman government of Asam, that Kachar was placed under British protection, and warning it to abstain from any project of molesting that country, and that any attempt against it would be regarded as an act of hostility, and communications were accordingly made by him repeatedly to that effect to the authorities in Asam. A force was also advanced from Dacca to Sylhet, consisting part of the 1st battalion of the 10th (14th)[9] native infantry, three companies of the 2nd battalion of the 23rd (46th) native infantry,

four companies of the Rungpore local corps, and a few guns; divisions of which, under Captains Johnstone and Bowe, and Major Newton, were posted at Bhadrapur, Jatrapur, and Talain, in advance of the Sylhet frontier, and covering that station against an attack from either of the directions in which it was menaced.

These arrangements were scarcely matured, when events justified their policy. The Burman armies, notwithstanding the representations of the commissioner in Asam, entered Kachar in different directions, and it became necessary to resist their progress, before they occupied positions which would give them the command of the Sylhet frontier, where their eruption into Kachar had already spread a general panic, and inflicted much serious mischief, causing many of the Ryots to abandon their homes, and putting a stop to cultivation. As it was evident that there was little hope of attention being paid to any representation or remonstrance, the British officers were instructed by the civil authority to oppose the advance of the Burmas by force, and hostilities speedily ensued.

In the early part of January, a force of about

four thousand Burmas and Asamese advanced from Asam into the province of Kachar, to the foot of the Bherteka pass, and began to stockade themselves at Bikrampore. Intelligence was also received that the troops under Gambhir Singh had been defeated by a Burma force from Manipur, and that a third Burma division was crossing into Jyntea, immediately to the north of the station of Sylhet. It was therefore judged advisable by Major Newton, the officer commanding on the Sylhet frontier, to concentrate his detachment at Jatrapur, a Kachar village about five miles beyond the boundaries of Sylhet, and thence advance against the invading party from Asam, before they should have time to complete their entrenchments. The British division accordingly marched at two A.M. on the 17th January, 1824, and at day-break came in sight of the stockade, whence a few shots were fired upon the advanced guard. An attack upon the position was immediately made in two divisions, one commanded by Captain Johnstone, upon the south face of the stockade, and the other under Captain Bowe, upon the village adjoining. The Burmas in the village presently gave way, but those in the stockade made a resolute resistance. The Burmas lost

about a hundred men, whilst six sipahis were killed on the part of the British. Those of the enemy who escaped fled to the hills, and as the strength of the British detachment did not admit of active pursuit, the fugitives soon rallied and effected their junction with the troops from Manipur.

Shortly after the action of the 17th January, the commissioner, Mr. Scott, arrived at Sylhet, and thence advanced to Bhadrapur, to maintain a more ready communication with the Burman authorities. On the 31st of January, a messenger sent by the magistrate, returned to camp, and from his information, as well as a letter previously received, it appeared, that the Burman generals professed to have advanced into Kachar upon an application formerly made by the ex-raja, Govind Chandra, for assistance, and that they had orders to follow and apprehend Chourjit, Marjit, and Gambhir Singh, wherever they might have taken refuge. In reply, a letter was addressed to the General commanding in Asam, stating that the English government had no objection to the re-establishment of Govind Chandra under their own protection, but that the interference of a Burman army for this purpose could not be permitted: that although

the Manipur chiefs could not be delivered up, they should be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of the province, and finally, the Burmas were required to evacuate the country, or the forces of the British government would be compelled to advance both into Kachar and Asam. It was also intimated, that any attempt upon Jyntea, which it was known was in contemplation, would be resisted. A letter had, in fact, been addressed by the commander of the Asam force to the raja of Jyntea, calling upon him and his ministers, whoever they might be, to bow in submission and send offerings, and ordering the raja to come to the Burmese camp. The raja had, accordingly, thrown himself upon the British government for protection.

To these communications no answer was received, the Burman commander declaring he could give none, until he had received instructions from Ava. The messengers sent by the commissioner were also detained for a considerable period in the Burmese camp under different pretexts, and it was evidently the object of the Burmas to procrastinate the negociations, until they had strengthened themselves in the position they occupied, which they might then hope to maintain

until the state of the weather rendered it impossible to act against them with advantage.

Subsequently to the action of the 17th January, Major Newton returned with the force under his command, to Sylhet, withdrawing the whole of the troops from Kachar. The Burmas then advanced to Jatrapur, about five miles east of the frontier, and eight miles from Bhadrapur, where the two divisions from Asam and Manipur having united, erected stockades on either bank of the Surma, connecting them by a bridge across the river. Their united force amounted to about six thousand, of whom four thousand were Asamese and Kacharees: a detachment of two thousand more was posted at Kila Kandy, in the south-east quarter of Kachar. The main body of the Burmas proceeded to push their stockades on the north bank of the Surma, to within one thousand yards of the British post at Bhadrapur, where Captain Johnstone commanded, having under him a wing of the 10th (14th) native infantry the third company of 23rd (46th), and a small party of the Rungpore local corps. With these he determined to dislodge the enemy before the entrenchments were completed, and having the concurrence of the commissioner, he moved against them on the

13th of February. Having divided his small force into two parties, one under Captain Bowe crossed the river, whilst the other, under his own command, proceeded higher up. Finding it unlikely to prevail upon the Burmas to discontinue their arrangements, by amicable expostulation, Captain Johnstone ordered the columns to attack. The Burmas fired as they advanced, but the troops pressed on without hesitation, and drove the enemy from their unfinished works at the point of the bayonet. The Asam division of the Burmas, fell back upon the Bherteka pass and the Jetinghi river, whilst the Manipur force stockaded itself at Doodpatlee.

With the view to expel the former of these detachments altogether from Kachar, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowen, who had joined, and taken the command, marched in pursuit of the retreating enemy. They were found at the foot of the Bherteka pass, stockading themselves in a strong position on the opposite bank of the Jetinghi river. The stream being deep and rapid, a passage was effected with some difficulty, and after a division of the force had crossed, it was found that a rivulet opening into the stream rendered an advance along the bank impracticable. It

was therefore necessary to make a detour through the thick jungle, which was accomplished only with great exertion; but the passage to the north-east angle of the stockade being at last effected, the troops formed, and carried it with the bayonet. The enemy fled to the hills, and left no further force in the direction of Asam to be encountered.

There still remained, however, the Manipur division to be expelled, and with this object Lieutenant-colonel Bowen directed his march against their position at Doodpatlee, which proved to be much stronger than any yet assailed. The Burmas were stockaded on the north bank of the Surma river. Their rear rested on steep hills. Each face of the entrenchment was defended by a deep ditch, about fourteen feet wide: a fence of bamboo spikes was constructed along the outer edge, and the approach on the land side was through jungle and high grass. After the post had been reconnoitered, and the three field-pieces with the detachment had been brought to bear upon it with considerable effect, the commanding officer directed the assault to be made upon the western front. The Burmas remained passive till the troops advanced

to the spikes, when they poured upon them a destructive and well-maintained fire, which checked the advance of the assailants, although they kept their ground. After being exposed to this fire for some time, and, as it appeared, with no hope of advantage, the attempt was abandoned. The force was withdrawn to Jatrapur. Four officers were wounded, two severely; Lieutenant Armstrong, of the 10th, was killed, and about one hundred and fifty sipahis were killed and wounded. On the 27th February, Colonel Innes joined the force at Jatrapur, with four guns, and the 1st battalion of the 19th regiment (38th), and assumed the command. In the meantime the Burmas retreated from the position at Doodpatlee, and fell back to Manipur, so that Kachar was freed from the presence of an enemy. As there seemed little reason to apprehend their speedy return in force, and the nature of the country rendered it difficult to procure supplies for any number of troops for a protracted period, it was thought sufficient to leave a detachment of the Rungpore local infantry in Kachar, whilst the main body went into cantonments at Sylhet.

While these events were taking place in Kachar, the occurrences in the southern extremity

of the frontier partook of the same character, and equally indicated the determination of the government of Ava to provoke hostilities. Early in January, the British detachment stationed on the island of Shahpuri was withdrawn, in consequence of the unhealthiness of the post, and, at the same time, intimation was conveyed to the raja of Arakan, that two British officers, Mr. Robertson, the civil commissioner, and Captain Cheap, had arrived at Tek Naf, where they were ready, under the orders of their government, to meet any persons the raja might depute, for the purpose of defining and settling the boundary. The raja sent four persons to meet the British authorities with a letter, demanding the unconditional surrender of the island; and his envoys, in the conferences that ensued, declared they would not enter upon any conversation respecting boundary, until the island was acknowledged to belong to the king of Ava, or at least allowed to be considered as neutral, and to be occupied by neither power. As this demand was not at once submitted to, they returned to Arakan, where it had been ascertained that a considerable force had been assembled under the four rajas, under whose several jurisdiction the province of

Arakan was divided. These were shortly afterwards placed under the supreme command of Maha Bundoola, the chief military officer of the state, who quitted Ava early in January, to take the supreme command, both civil and military in Arakan, and brought with him considerable reinforcements. Shortly prior to his arrival, however, four individuals, said to have been deputed by the court of Ava, arrived at Mungdoo, and under their authority a wanton outrage was perpetrated, which could only tend to precipitate the commencement of the war. When the sipahis were withdrawn from Shahpuri, the Honourable Company's pilot-vessel *Sophia* was ordered to join the gun-boats off that island, to serve in some degree as a substitute for the troops that had been removed. Upon the arrival of the deputies, or wuzeers, at Mungdoo, on the opposide bank of the Naf, they invited the commanding officer of the *Sophia* on shore, under the pretext of communicating with him amicably on the state of affairs, and on his unguardedly accepting the invitation, they seized him, and an officer and the native seamen who accompanied him, and sent them prisoners to Arakan, where they were threatened with detention until the

chief Mug insurgents should be delivered in exchange. Mr. Chew, the commander of the *Sophia*, was kept at Arakan from the 20th January to the 13th February, when he was sent back, with his companions and some natives of Chittagong, to Mungdoo. The alleged motive of this seizure was, the removal of the vessel from its anchorage off Shahpuri, and the act was no doubt intended as one of intimidation. In a similar light might be considered the circumstance of the Burman agents crossing from Mungdoo to Shahpuri, and planting the flag of Ava on the island. This was a bravado little worthy of notice, and was only important as displayed after the arrival of Maha Bundoola, and, consequently, indicative of the spirit by which he was likely to be actuated; but the forcible arrest of an officer in the British service, was a national insult that could not be suffered to pass without apology or excuse, neither of which it was likely would be tendered. As the two states might now be considered as actually, although not declaredly, at war, the British government, agreeably to the usage of civilized nations, promulgated the grounds of their recourse to hostile measures, in a declaration addressed to the court of Ava, and the dif-

ferent powers of India, and in a public proclamation, dated the 5th March. In these documents, the causes of the war were declared to be the acts of encroachment and aggression, so perseveringly committed on the south-east frontier, the attack upon the post of Shahpuri, the arrest of a British officer and crew, the invasion of Kachar, and the menaces addressed to the Jyntea raja, and the tacit approbation of the conduct of their officers by the court of Ava, which evinced a determination not only to withhold all explanation and atonement for past injuries, but to prosecute projects of the most extravagant and mischievous ambition, pregnant with serious danger to the British government. The proclamation was speedily followed by a communication from Pegu, in reply to that addressed to the court of Ava in the preceding November, which might be considered as a counter-manifesto, as it declared, in terms of singular arrogance, that the governors on the frontier had full power to act, and that until everything was settled, a communication need not be made to the "golden feet."

The war being now formally declared by the British government, and virtually announced by the court of Ava, measures were taken at once

of the Kullung with that river. The Burmas stockaded at Hautbur, pursued their previous system of not waiting for an attack, but deserted the stockade, and retired to Rangligher, a post at the distance of about eight hours' march. A small party, however, having returned to re-occupy the Hautbur stockade, were surprised by Lieutenant Richardson, with a resala of horse, and a company of infantry. The surprise was effectual. The enemy, in attempting to escape, fell upon the horse, by whom about twenty were killed, besides a phokun, or officer of rank.

Whilst the main body of the detachment continued at Kaliabur, a small party was left under Captain Horsburgh, in the stockade of Hautbur on the Kullung, at a short distance from its junction with the main stream. The Burmas exhibited, on this occasion, the only proof of enterprise which they had yet displayed in the campaign in Asam, and advancing from their entrenchment at Rangligher, they attempted to cut off Captain Horsburgh and his division. Their advance was, however, seasonably ascertained, and arrested by the picquet, until the whole detachment could form. Upon Captain Horsburgh's approach with the infantry, the

Burmas fled, but the irregular horse, which had been sent into their rear, having intercepted the retreat of about two hundred, a great number of them were sabred on the spot, or drowned in crossing the Kullung. After this repulse, they abandoned the Rangligher stockade, and retrograded to Maura Mookh, where their chief force, now not exceeding one thousand men, was posted under the governor of Asam. Colonel Richards having succeeded to the command, upon the death of Brigadier McMorine, of cholera, early in May, established his head-quarters at Kaliabur; but upon the setting in of the rains, it was found necessary to retire to Gohati, in order to secure the receipt of supplies. The operations of the first campaign in Asam were closed by a successful attack upon a stockade on the north bank of the Brahmaputra, by Captain Wallace; the enemy had time to escape, but the stockade was destroyed. The general result of the operations was decidedly favourable, and the British authority was established over a considerable tract of country between Goalpara and Gohati. It is likely, however, that had an advance like that made by Colonel Richards in April, been authorised a few weeks sooner, the Burmas might

have been expelled from a still greater portion of Asam; their force in this country never having been formidable, either in numbers or equipment.

In prosecution of the offensive system of operations, a powerful force was fitted out by the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, destined to reduce the islands on the Coast of Ava, and to occupy Rangoon, and the country at the mouth of the Irawadi river. The Bengal armament left the Hooghly in the beginning of April. Their further proceedings we shall hereafter notice, in order to keep the course of them entire, and in the mean time shall terminate the military transactions on the British frontier.

It has been already noticed, that a large Burman force had been assembled in Arakan, under the command of the chief military officer of the state of Ava, Maha Mengyee Bundoola, an officer who enjoyed a high reputation, and the entire confidence of the court, and who had been one of the most strenuous advisers of the war, in the full confidence, that it would add a vast accession of power to his country and glory to himself. His head-quarters were established at Arakan, where, probably, from ten to twelve thousand Burmas were assembled. Early in May, a division of this

force crossed the Naf, and advanced to Rutnapullung, about fourteen miles south from Ramoo, where they took up their position, and gradually concentrated their force, to the extent of about eight thousand men, under the command of the four rajas of Arakan, Ramree, Sandaway, and Cheduba, assisted by four of the inferior members of the royal council, or atwenwoons, and acting under the orders of Bundoola, who remained at Arakan.

Upon information being received of the Burmas having appeared, advancing upon Rutnapullung, Captain Noton moved from Ramoo with the whole of his disposable force to ascertain the strength and objects of the enemy. On arriving near their position, upon some hills on the left of the road, in which the Burmas had stockaded themselves, they opened a smart fire upon the detachment, which, however, cleared the hills, and formed upon a plain beyond them. In consequence, however, of the mismanagement of the elephant drivers, and the want of artillery details, the guns accompanying the division, could not be brought into action, and as without them, it was not possible to make any impression on the enemy, Captain Noton judged it prudent to return to his station at Ra-

moo, where he was joined by three companies of the 40th native infantry, making his whole force about one thousand strong, of whom less than half were regulars. With these, Captain Noton determined to await at Ramoo, the approach of the Burmas, until the arrival of reinforcements from Chittagong.

On the morning of the 13th of May, the enemy advanced from the south, and occupied, as they arrived, the hills east of Ramoo, being separated from the British force by the Ramoo river. On the evening of the 14th, they made a demonstration of crossing the river, but were prevented by the fire from the two six-pounders with the detachment. On the morning of the 15th, however, they effected their purpose, and crossed the river upon the left of the detachment, when they advanced, and took possession of a tank, surrounded as usual with tanks in this situation, by a high embankment, which protected them from the fire of their opponents. Captain Noton drew up his force behind a bank about three feet high, completely surrounding the encampment. Upon his right hand, and about sixty paces in front to the eastward was a tank, at which a strong picquet was posted, and his right flank was also pro-

tected by the river. On his left, and somewhat to the rear, was another tank, at which he stationed the provincials and Mug levy. The regular sipahis were posted with the six-pounders on his front, or along the eastern face of the embankment. From this face a sharp fire was kept upon the Burmas as they crossed the plain to the tank, but they availed themselves with such dexterity of every kind of cover, and so expeditiously entrenched themselves, that it was much less effective than was to have been expected.

Information having been received on the 15th, that the left wing of the battalion of the 23rd native infantry had left Chittagong on the 13th, and its arrival being therefore looked for on the following day, Captain Noton was confirmed in his intention of remaining at his post, although the Burmas were in very superior numbers, and were evidently gaining ground. Several of the officers were wounded, and the provincials had manifested strong indications of insubordination and alarm.

On the morning of the 16th, the Burmas, it was found, had considerably advanced their trenches. The firing was maintained on both sides throughout the day, but no important

change in the relative position of the two parties was effected. The officer in command of the guns, however, was disabled, and it was with some difficulty that the provincials were intimidated from the desertion of their post; a retreat was still practicable, but a reliance upon the arrival of the expected reinforcement, unfortunately prevented the adoption of the only measure which could now afford a chance of preserving the lives of the officers and men.

On the morning of the 17th, the enemy's trenches were advanced within twelve paces of the picquets, and a heavy and destructive fire was kept up by them. At about nine A.M. the provincials and Mug levy abandoned the tank entrusted to their defence, and it was immediately occupied by the enemy. The position being now untenable, a retreat was ordered, and effected with some regularity for a short distance. The increasing numbers and audacity of the pursuers, and the activity of a small body of horse attached to their force, by whom the men that fell off from the main body were instantly cut to pieces, filled the troops with an ungovernable panic, which rendered the exertions of their officers to preserve order unavailing. These

efforts, however, were persisted in, until the arrival of the party at a rivulet, when the detachment dispersed, and the sipahis throwing away their arms and accoutrements, plunged promiscuously into the water. In the retreat, Captains Noton, Trueman, and Pringle, Lieutenant Grigg, Ensign Bennet, and Assistant-surgeon Maysmore were killed. The other officers engaged, Lieutenants Scott, Campbell, and Codrington, made their escape, but the two former were wounded: the loss in men was not ascertained, as many of them found their way after some interval, and in small numbers, to Chittagong: according to official returns between six and eight hundred had reached Chittagong by the 23rd May, so that the whole loss in killed and taken, did not exceed probably two hundred and fifty. Many of those taken prisoners were sent to Ava, where they served to confirm the arrogant belief of the court in the irresistible prowess of their troops, and their anticipations of future triumph. The defeat of the detachment at Ramoo, was also the source of great uneasiness at Chittagong and Dacca, and the panic spread even to Calcutta, where, however absurd the supposition, it was thought by many

not impossible that the enemy might penetrate through the Sunderban forest to the metropolis of British India. Weak as was the force at Chittagong, a rapid advance of the Burmas might have compelled its retreat; and Chittagong and perhaps Dacca might have been exposed to hostile depredation. All anxiety, however, was soon allayed, by the evident want of enterprise in the victors, and by confidence in the measures immediately taken to oppose the remote possibility of their further advance. Colonel Shapland was speedily reinforced to an extent that placed the frontier out of danger, had the Burmas shown any inclination to prosecute their success. With exception, however, of an advance to Chekeria, whence they soon retrograded, the capture of the small post at Tek Naf, and an unsuccessful attempt to cut off the *Vestal* cruiser and the gun-boats in the river, the Burman general undertook no other military operations in this quarter, and was shortly after recalled, with the most effective portion of his force, for the defence of the provinces of Ava. By the end of July the Burmas had abandoned all their positions to the north of the Naf.

The absence of the British troops from Kachar

and the system of active operations apparently adopted at this period by the court of Ava, seem to have induced the Burmas to renew their invasion of that province. They advanced from Manipur, and resumed their position upon the heights of Talain, Doodpatlee, and Jatrapur. The force that occupied these positions, was estimated at about eight thousand men, and it was given out that they formed the van of an army of fifteen thousand destined by the court of Ava to march upon the frontier in this direction.

In consequence of the apprehensions excited for the safety of Chittagong and Dacca, after the defeat at Ramoo, the force at Sylhet had, in the first instance, moved from the latter station towards the south. The alarm having subsided, the movement was countermanded, and Colonel Innes returned to Sylhet on the 12th of June, with the troops under his command, amounting to above twelve hundred men, with which he again proceeded to Kachar to expel the invaders, after resting a few days at Sylhet, from the fatigues to which the period of the year, and the inundated state of the country had exposed the troops. On the 20th June, Colonel Innes arrived at Bhadrapur, from whence he pro-

ceeded by water, along the Barak river to Jatrapur, where, with considerable difficulty, he arrived on the 27th. On the route, an opportunity offered to reconnoitre the position of the enemy on the heights of Talain, where they were strongly stockaded, and it was determined to attempt to dislodge them from their post. With this view part of the force was landed, and a battery of two howitzers and four six-pounders erected on a rising ground, about six hundred yards on the south-west of the stockade, which opened on the 6th July; as the guns, however, made but little impression at the distance at which they were placed, they were removed on the 7th to an eminence nearer to the stockade, the occupation of which was spiritedly, though unsuccessfully, opposed by the enemy. On the 8th, however, they assembled in force upon the heights in rear of and commanding the battery, dislodging the party of raja Gambhir Singh's men who had been stationed on the hills for its protection, and frustrating, by their superior numbers an attempt made to turn their flank: it was therefore found necessary to bring off the guns, and as the troops were exhausted by the fatiguing service they had undergone, and the season was becoming every day more unfavourable

for military operations, it was determined to fall back to Jatrapur, to which the troops accordingly retired. The increasing sickness of the men, induced by constant exposure to the rain in the midst of a country abounding with swamp and jungle, compelled a retreat to a more healthy situation, and the force was disposed along the river near to Bhadrapur, either in boats or in elevated situations on the banks. The Burmas remained in their entrenchments, being, in fact, confined to them by the rise of the rivers; and no further movements took place on either side during the continuance of the rains.

We have thus terminated the first period of the system of defensive operations, and shall now proceed to the more important enterprises of an offensive war, to which those we have noticed were wholly subordinate. The results of the operations described were of a mixed description, but such as to leave no question of the issue of the contest. In Asam a considerable advance had been made. In Kachar also, a forward position had been maintained, although the nature of the country, the state of the weather, and the insufficiency of the force, prevented the campaign from closing with the success with

which it had begun. The disaster at Ramoo, although it might have been avoided perhaps by a more decided conduct on the part of the officer commanding, and would certainly have been prevented by greater promptitude than was shown in the despatch of the expected reinforcements, reflected no imputation upon the courage of the regular troops, and, except in the serious loss of lives, was wholly destitute of any important consequences. In all these situations the Burmas had displayed neither personal intrepidity nor military skill. Their whole system of warfare resolved itself into a series of entrenchments which they threw up with great readiness and ingenuity. Behind these defences they sometimes displayed considerable steadiness and courage, but as they studiously avoided individual exposure they were but little formidable in the field as soldiers. Neither was much to be apprehended from the generalship that suffered the victory of Ramoo to pass away without making the slightest demonstration of a purpose to improve a crisis of such splendid promise, and which restricted the fruits of a battle gained to the construction of a stockade.

The difficulty of collecting a sufficient force for a maritime expedition from Bengal, owing to the repugnance which the sipahis entertain to embarking on board vessels, where their prejudices expose them to many real privations, had early led to a communication with the presidency of Fort Saint George, where there existed no domestic call for a large force, and where the native troops were ready to undertake the voyage without reluctance. The views of the supreme government were promptly met by Sir Thomas Munro, the governor of Madras, and a considerable force was speedily equipped. The like activity pervaded the measures of the Bengal authorities, and by the beginning of April the whole was ready for sea.

The period of the year at which this expedition was fitted out, was recommended by various considerations of local or political weight. Agreeably to the information of all nautical men, a more favourable season for navigating the coast to the eastward could not be selected, and from the account given by those who had visited Ava, it appeared, that the expedition upon arriving at Rangoon would be able to proceed into the interior without delay; the rising of the river

and the prevalence of a south-easterly wind rendering June or July the most eligible months for an enterprise which could only be effected by water conveyance, by which it was asserted that a sufficient force might be conveyed to Amarapura, the capital, a distance of five hundred miles, in the course of a month or five weeks.[10] That no time should be lost in compelling the Burmas to act upon the defensive, was also apparent, as by the extent of their preparations in Arakan, Asam and Kachar, they were evidently manifesting a design to invade the frontier with a force that would require the concentration of a large body of troops for the protection of the British provinces in situations where mountains, streams and forests, could not fail to exercise a destructive influence upon the physical energies of the officers and men, and would necessarily prevent the full development of the military resources of the state. To have remained throughout the rains, therefore, wholly on the defensive, would have been attended, it was thought, with a greater expense, and, under ordinary circumstances, with a greater sacrifice of lives than an aggressive movement, as well as with some compromise of national reputation. The armament,

therefore, was equipped at once, and was not slow in realising some of the chief advantages expected from its operations.

The Bengal force was formed of His Majesty's 38th and 13th regiments, of the second battalion of the 20th (now 40th) native infantry, and two companies of European artillery, amounting in all to two thousand one hundred and seventy-five fighting men. The Madras force, in two divisions, consisting of Her Majesty's 41st and 89th regiment, the Madras European regiment, seven battalions of native infantry, and four companies of artillery, besides golandaz, gun lascars, and pioneers, amounted altogether to nine thousand and three hundred fighting men, making a total of eleven thousand four hundred and seventy-five fighting men of all ranks, of whom nearly five thousand were Europeans. In addition to the transports, the Bengal force comprised a flotilla of twenty gun-brigs, and as many row-boats, carrying one eighteen-pounder each. The Bengal fleet was also accompanied by his Majesty's sloops *Larne*, Capt. Marryatt, and *Sophia*, Capt. Ryves, by several of the Company's cruisers, and the *Diana* steam boat. Major-general Sir A. Campbell, K.C.B., was appointed to the com-

town itself, is defended by an enclosure of palisades ten or twelve feet high, strengthened internally by embankments of earth, and protected externally on one side by the river, and on the other three sides by a shallow creek or ditch, communicating with the river, and expanding at the western end into a morass crossed by a bridge. The palisade incloses the whole of the town of Rangoon in the shape of an irregular parallellogram, having one gate in each of three faces, and two in that of the north; at the river gate is a landing-place, denominated the king's wharf, in which situation the principal battery was placed, and opposite to which the *Liffey* came to anchor about two P. M. After a short pause, a fire was opened on the fleet, but was very soon silenced by the guns of the frigate. In the meantime, three detachments were landed from the transports, of his Majesty's 38th regiment, under Major Evans, above the town, and his Majesty's 41st, under Colonel McBean below it, whilst Major Sale, with the light infantry of the 13th, was directed to attack the river gate, and carry the main battery. These measures were successful. The Burmas fled from the advance of the troops, and in less than

twenty minutes the town was in the undisputed possession of the British. Whilst the divisions were moving to the shore, Mr. Hough, an American missionary, came on board the *Liffey*, accompanied by a native officer, having been deputed by the raywoon to demand the object of the attack made upon the town, and intimating that, unless the firing ceased, the lives of the Europeans in confinement would be sacrificed. Any stipulation for terms of surrender were now, necessarily, of little avail, but assurances were given that persons and property would be respected, and the release of the European prisoners was insisted on, under menaces of severe retaliation, if they suffered any violence. The chief authorities of the town, however, were too much alarmed to await the return of their messengers, and abandoned the place before they relanded.

Upon taking possession of Rangoon, it was found to be entirely deserted. The news of the arrival of the fleet had scarcely reached the town, when the population began to depart, and to secrete themselves in the adjacent thickets. This desertion was, in a great measure, the effect of a univeral panic, but it was promoted by the

local authorities, in order to deprive their invaders of the resources of the population. The perseverance, however, with which the natives of the country submitted to the privations to which they were exposed in the jungle, during the heavy rains that ensued, clearly proved that the abandonment of their homes was, in a considerable measure, a voluntary act, emanating, not perhaps from any feeling of rancorous hostility, but a firm conviction that the occupation of Rangoon by the invaders would be but temporary, and that to submit to their rule would only involve themselves in that destruction to which they were devoted. However this may be, the absence of the population, and the impossibility of deriving any aid from their local experience and activity, were productive of serious inconvenience to the expedition, and more than anything else disconcerted the expectations which had been formed of its immediate results.

One of the first objects of the British commander on occupying the town, was the rescue of his countrymen and other Christians, who were in confinement, and the party under Major Sale discovered and released in the custom-house two English traders, with an Armenian and a

Greek, who had been left there in irons; seven other prisoners of this class had been carried awayby the Burmas in their flight, but they were all liberated on the following morning by the detachment sent out from the town to reconnoitre the ground, who found them in different chambers where they had been secured, and forgotten by the Burman chiefs, in the confusion of their retreat.

The days immediately following the capture of Rangoon were appropriated to the landing and disposition of the troops, who were posted in the town, in the great pagoda of Shwe-da-gon, about two miles and a-half from the town, or on the two roads which, leading from each of the northern gates, gradually converge until they unite near the pagoda, leaving a tolerably open space between them. Parties of seamen from his Majesty's vessels, with detachments of the European regiment were also employed in scouring the river, and to discover and destroy any armed boats or fire rafts, which it was thought likely the enemy would prepare. In one of these excursions, a stockade having been observed in course of construction at the village of Kemendine, about six miles distant from the

town, it was attacked by the grenadier company of his Majesty's 38th, and the boats of the *Liffey*, and stormed with great intrepidity, although maintained by four hundred of the enemy, who behaved with considerable spirit, and, notwithstanding the strength of its defences, it was carried, accordingly not without some loss. Lieutenant Kerr, of the 38th, was killed, and Lieutenant Wilkinson, R.N., who commanded the boats, was dangerously wounded; the enemy suffered still more severely, and left sixty killed in the stockade. Detachments were also sent into the interior, to endeavour to find and bring back the population, but without success. On this occasion, parties of the Burmas were sometimes encountered, and skirmishes ensued, with invariably advantageous results to the invading force; measures were also adopted to collect boats and supplies as far as practicable, with a view to the ultimate advance into the country. Some heavy falls of rain occurred in the latter part of May, and cover was provided for the troops with the least possible delay. They were cantoned chiefly along the two roads before mentioned, in the numerous pagodas and religious buildings which connected the chief temple with

the town. The staff and different departments were placed in the town, whilst the terrace of the great pagoda was occupied by part of his Majesty's 89th regiment and the Madras artillery, and formed the key to the whole position. The Shwe-da-gon pagoda stands upon a mound, to which the ascent is by eighty or a hundred stone steps, and the summit of which is about eight hundred feet square. Besides the central edifice, or the temple itself, which is a solid building rising from an octangular base by a gradually diminishing spheroidal outline to the height of 300 feet, a number of buildings, smaller shrines, or the habitations of the attending priests, chiefly of teak, and curiously carved and gilt, surmount the elevation, and formed not incommodious dwellings. It very soon appeared that there was little chance of quitting this position before the end of the rainy season, as the disappearance of the inhabitants rendered it impossible to provide and equip a flotilla necessary to proceed up the river, or to man it with rowers when equipped. The same circumstance, and the desolate state of the country, from which nothing in the shape of supplies was to be procured, rendered it equally certain, that both for

the temporary occupation of Rangoon, and eventual march into the interior, the force was entirely dependent upon the presidencies of Bengal and Madras for every description of conveyance and food; a state of things which was little to have been expected, from the known commerce and supposed resources of Rangoon, and for which, accordingly, no previous preparation had been made.

Whilst thus situated, the force at Rangoon was re-joined by the detachments which had been despatched against Cheduba and Negrais. The latter, a small island of about six miles in circumference, was found uninhabited, but the enemy having collected in some force on the opposite main land, and constructed a stockade, Major Wahab detached a part of his force against them. The first division, three companies of the 17th regiment Madras native infantry, having landed within a short distance of the enemy's entrenchment, the officer commanding determined to advance at once against them without waiting for support, and giving them time to prepare for the contest. Having carried a breast-work, which had been thrown up by the enemy, the party came upon a stockade, one angle of which being still open,

they were able to direct their fire amongst those within it, supposed to amount to between seven and eight hundred men, who abandoned the defences after sustaining some loss. Having destroyed the stockade, and brought off the guns and ammunition found in it, Major Wahab reembarked his men and sailed for Rangoon, being short of provisions, and not considering that any further advantage would be derived from the occupation of Negrais, or an advance to Bassein, the success of which was, in some degree, doubtful, from his comparative inferiority to the Burman force.

The capture of Cheduba, by the force under Brigadier McCreagh, was attended with more permanent results, and was more vigorously contested. The transports with the *Slaney*, sloop of war, collected off the mouth of the river leading to the chief town, on the night of the 12th of May, and early on the 14th, two hundred of his Majesty's 13th, and one hundred of the 20th native infantry, being embarked in such boats as could be assembled, proceeded up the river: about a mile up the river, the enemy were discovered in some force on the northern bank, and as the headmost boat arrived upon their right flank,

they opened a slight fire, on which the troops landed, and after a short contest, compelled them to retreat. They retired with some precipitation upon the village, and passing through it, gained a strong stockade at the further end. The guns were landed from the ships without delay, and a battery opened upon the gateway by the 18th, the fire of which having much weakened the defences, Major Thornhill, with a company of the 13th, forced an entrance into the stockade, without much difficulty. After a short contest, in which their commander was slain, the Burmas retreated by the opposite gate, leaving a great number killed. The loss of the assailants was inconsiderable. On the 19th, the raja of Cheduba was taken by a reconnoitring party, and sent prisoner shortly afterwards to Calcutta; such of the Burman force as had been sent to his succour, and survived the late action, returned to the main land, and the people of Cheduba very readily submitted to the British rule. Brigadier McCreagh, therefore, leaving Lieutenant-colonel Hampton with his detachment of the 20th native infantry, and the sloop *Slaney*, for the protection of the island, proceeded with the European division to Rangoon, where he arrived on the 11th of June.

Between this date and the attack of the Kemendine stockade, on the 10th of May, several engagements had taken place with the Burmas, who having received reinforcements, had been for some days closing upon the British lines, and entrenching themselves in their immediate vicinity, or concealed in the dense jungle that grew close to the posts, maintained a system of harassing attacks, cutting off stragglers, firing upon the picquets, and creating constant alarms by night as well as by day, which subjected the troops to much unnecessary and hurtful exposure and fatigue. In order to deter them from persisting in this mode of warfare, as well as more precisely to estimate their number and position, Sir Archibald Campbell marched out on the morning of the 28th of May, with four companies of Europeans from his Majesty's 13th and 38th regiments, two hundred and fifty sipahis, one gun, and a howitzer, against the entrenchments in the vicinity of the camp, which were supported, it was said, by a considerable body of troops under the command of the governor of Shwedang. After passing and destroying three unfinished and undefended stockades, and exchanging a few shots with such of the enemy as showed themselves from time to time in the jungle,

the artillery-men being exhausted with fatigue, the guns were sent back under an escort of the native infantry, and Sir Archibald continued to advance with the Europeans, through rice fields, some inches under water, and in a heavy fall of rain. After a most fatiguing march of eight or ten miles, the enemy was discovered in great numbers at the village of Joazong, and defended in front by two stockades. The attack was immediately ordered, and the stockades were carried at the point of the bayonet, in the most daring and determined manner. A demonstration was then made of advancing against the Burman line, which immediately fell back, as if intending to retreat into the thicket, and, as it seemed doubtful if they could be brought to action, the detachment returned to the lines. The loss they sustained was severe. Lieutenant Howard, of the 13th, was killed, and Lieutenants Mitchell and O'Halloran, severely wounded, each subsequently losing a leg by amputation. The enemy was said to have left three hundred dead in the stockades, in which the conflict was maintained for some time man to man. Brigadier General Macbean, with two regiments and some howitzers, was sent out on the following morning to the same spot, to see if he could again fall in with

the Burman force, but they had disappeared, and the stockades remained deserted. On the following day, a party of the enemy were driven with some loss from a stockade in the jungle, not far from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, by the light company of the 38th, under Major Piper, and on the same day a detachment, under Colonel Godwin, was sent against Siriam, which fort was found, on the opposite side of the Pegu river, abandoned.

The strongest position occupied by the Burmas, at this time, was at Kemendine, upon the river, nearly two miles above the post called, also, the Kemendine stockade, from which they were driven on the 10th of May. At this place the Burmas had erected one main stockade of unusual strength and extent, whilst in the vicinity there were several others, more or less elaborately constructed. In order to remove them from the position, two columns of the Madras force, one under Lieutenant-colonel Hodgson, and the other under Lieutenant-colonel Smith, marched on the 3rd of June from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda, to attack the post by land, whilst Sir Archibald Campbell proceeded up the river with two cruisers, and three companies of his Majesty's 41st. The vessels advanced abreast of the entrenchment, and the

troops landed and burnt the village. The land columns arrived in the vicinity of the stockade after a very harrassing march, but one of them failed to make way into the entrenchments, and the other, as they moved through the thicket within gun shot, were mistaken for a body of Burmas, and received a heavy cannonade from the armed vessels on the river, which occasioned some loss, and disconcerted the troops, so that they could not be afterwards led to the attack; the force therefore was obliged to return without accomplishing the object for which it had marched.

Previous to the attack upon this post, two Burmas, of inferior rank, had come into Rangoon, stating that they were sent to ascertain the objects of the British, by the newly appointed meywoon, or viceroy, who was at Kemendine with the governor of Prome: as they could produce no credentials, it was supposed that they were merely spies; but they were civilly treated, and sent back. On the 5th of June, two other messengers arrived to announce the proposed mission of other officers of high rank, two of whom, whose attendants, and gilt umbrellas, indicated them to be personages of consequence,

came down to Rangoon in two war boats; the senior had been the Woon of Bassein, but was now a personal attendant on the king. They were received by the Commander-in-Chief and Political Commissioner, and stated that they were deputed by Thekia Woongyee, recently nominated viceroy of Pegu, and then at Donabew, to which place they invited Sir Archibald Campbell, or Major Canning, to repair, expressing themselves willing to remain as hostages for their return. As such a proposal, however, could not be listened to, and it appeared, that Thekia Woongyee could do no more than forward the result of the conferences, supposing him sincere in wishing to open them, to the court, it was stated in reply, that the Commissioner would be content with an opportunity of forwarding despatches to Ava: to this the deputies engaged to obtain the viceroy's assent, and promised to return with it on the 15th. As, however, they did not repeat their visit, it seems probable, that their only object was to gain time, and suspend the British operations until the force assembling at Donabew should be ready to act. If such was their object, it was disappointed, and on the 10th of June, a strong force was sent once more against Kemendine and the stockades inland between it and the great pagoda.

The force destined for this service, consisting of nearly three thousand men, with four eighteen pounders and four mortars, moved from the lines on the morning of the 10th of June, under the Commander-in-Chief, whilst two divisions of vessels proceeded up the river to attack the stockade in that direction. On the march, the land columns came upon a strong stockade, about two miles from the town: in front, the palisades were from twelve to fourteen feet high, strengthened by cross bars and railing of great solidity; on the other three sides, it was protected by the denseness of the surrounding jungle: it was invested on three sides, and a breach being made in front by the fire of the two eighteen pounders, the Madras European Regiment, supported by his Majesty's 41st, made good their entrance, whilst, at the same time, the advanced companies of the 13th and 38th, clambered over the palisades on another side, and co-operated in clearing the entrenchment. The enemy fled into the thicket, but they left one hundred and fifty dead, including a chief of some rank, as indicated by his golden chattah. Several of the British officers and soldiers distinguished themselves by their personal prowess on this, and on similar occasions, being engaged repeatedly in single combat with their antagonists

in the melée that followed the storm of a stockade. Before the Burmans had learned to appreciate the valour of those with whom they had to contend, these conflicts were of necessity sanguinary; for, unaccustomed to civilised warfare, they neither gave nor expected to receive quarter; and whenever, therefore, unable to escape, they rushed desperately upon the bayonets of their assailants, and often provoked their death by treacherously attempting to effect that of the soldiers by whom they had been overcome and spared.

After carrying this post, the force moved forward to the river, where it came upon the chief stockade, which was immediately invested. The left of the line communicated with the flotilla, but the right could not be sufficiently extended to shut in the entrenchment completely between it and the river, in consequence of the enemy having thrown up other works beyond the stockade. By four o'clock, the troops were in position in a thick jungle, and no time was lost in bringing the guns to bear; but the works could not be completed before dark, and the troops were obliged to bivouac for the night under an incessant fall of rain without any shelter, and with soft mud on which to recline. Notwithstanding

these obstacles, batteries were erected during the night, and opened at daylight on the 11th; after a cannonade of two hours, a party advancing to observe the breach found that the enemy had evacuated the stockade, carrying with them their dead and wounded. The immediate contiguity and thickness of the jungle, enabled them to effect their retreat unobserved. The stockade of Kemendine, commanding the river between it and the town, and connecting the head of the British line, the Shwe-da-gon pagoda with the river, secured the latter from being turned, or the town of Rangoon from being threatened in that direction, and it was therefore occupied by a small European detail, and a battalion of native infantry. The Burmese, after the capture of their post, retired for a while from the immediate vicinity of the British lines, and continued to concentrate their forces at Donabew.

In the short interval of comparative tranquillity that ensued between this date and the renewal of active operations, the British authorities had leisure to consider the position in which they were placed. An advance up the river, whilst either bank was commanded by the enemy in such formidable numbers and by strong entrench-

ments, was wholly out of the question, as, although conveyance for the troops and ordnance had been provided, the impossibility of deriving supplies from the country was undeniable, and it was equally impracticable to maintain a communication with Rangoon. It was clearly necessary, therefore, to begin by annihilating the force immediately opposed to the invading army, before any advance could be attempted. But this was not so easy a task as was to have been anticipated from the superior organisation and valour of the British army. In the field, the enemy were as little able as inclined to face the British force, but their dexterity and perseverance in throwing up entrenchments, rendered their expulsion from these an undertaking that involved a loss of time and sacrifice of lives, and the country and seasons stood them in the stead of discipline and courage. The vicinity of Rangoon, except about the town or along the main road, was covered with swamp or jungle, through which the men were obliged to wade knee-deep in water, or force their way through harrassing and wearisome entanglements. The rains had set in, and the effects of a burning sun were only relieved by the torrents that fell from the accumulated clouds, and which

brought disease along with their coolness. Constantly exposed to the vicissitudes of a tropical climate, and exhausted by the necessity of unintermitted exertion, it need not be a matter of surprise that sickness now began to thin the ranks and impair the energies of the invaders. No rank was exempt from the operation of these causes, and many officers, amongst whom were the senior naval officer, Captain Marryatt, the political commissioner, Major Canning, and the commander-in-chief, himself were attacked with fever during the month of June. Amongst the privates, the Europeans especially, the sickness incident to fatigue and exposure was aggravated by the defective quantity and quality of the provisions which had been supplied for their use. Relying upon the reported facility of obtaining cattle and vegetables at Rangoon, it had not been thought necessary to embark stores for protracted consumption on board the transports from Calcutta, and the Madras troops landed with a still more limited stock. As soon as the deficiency was ascertained, arrangements were made to remedy it, but in the meantime, before supplies could reach Rangoon, the troops were dependent for food upon salt meat, much of which

was in a state of putrescence, and biscuit in an equally repulsive condition, under the decomposing influence of heat and moisture. The want of sufficient and wholesome food enhanced the evil effects of the damp soil and atmosphere, and of the malaria from the decaying vegetable matter of the surrounding forests, and the hospitals were rapidly filled with sick beyond the means available of medical treatment; fever and dysentery were the principal maladies, and were no more than the ordinary consequences of local causes; but the scurvy and hospital gangrene, which also made their appearance, were ascribable as much to depraved habits and inadequate nourishment, as to fatigue and exposure. They were also latterly, in some degree, the consequences of extreme exhaustion, forming a peculiar feature of the prevailing fever, which bore an epidemic type, and which had been felt with equal severity in Bengal. The fatal operation of these causes was enhanced by their continuance, and towards the end of the rainy season, scarcely three thousand men were fit for active duty. The arrival of adequate supplies, and more especially the change of the monsoon, restored the force to a more healthy condition.[11]

Although, however, the proportion of the sick was a serious deduction from the available force, it was not such as to render it unequal to offensive operations altogether, or inadequate to repel, in the most decisive manner, the collected assault of the Burman force that had been some time assembling in its vicinity. During the month of June, several affairs of minor importance occurred, and on the first July, the only general action in which the troops had yet been engaged took place.

On receiving intelligence of the occupation of Rangoon by the British armament, the court of Ava was far from feeling any apprehension or alarm; on the contrary, the news was welcomed as peculiarly propitious; the destruction of the invaders was regarded as certain, and the only anxiety entertained was, lest they should effect a retreat before they were punished for their presumption. Notwithstanding the unseasonable period of the year, therefore, orders were sent to collect as large a force as possible to surround and capture the British, and one of the chief officers of state, the Thekia Woongyee, was despatched to assume the command. The result of these arrangements was little calculated to inspire

the court of Ava with confidence in its officers or men.

On the morning of the 1st of July, the Burman force was observed in motion. The main body drew up upon the left of the British lines in front of the Kemendine stockade, and Shweda-gon pagoda, but they were screened from observation by the intervening thicket, and their disposition and strength could not be ascertained. Three columns, each of about 1,000 men, moved across to the right of the line, where they came in contact with the picquets of the 7th and 22nd regiments of Madras native infantry, which steadily maintained their ground against these superior numbers. The enemy then penetrated between the picquets, and occupied a hill, whence they commenced an ineffective fire on the lines, but were speedily dislodged by three companies of the 7th and 23rd regiments Madras native infantry, with a gun and howitzer, under Captain Jones, and the personal direction of the commander-in-chief; after a short but effective fire, the sipahis were ordered to charge, which they did with great steadiness, and the enemy immediately broke and fled into the jungle. The body in front of the head of the lines apparently

awaited the effect of this attack, and fell back immediately on its failure; part of the force re-crossing the river, a considerable division entered the town of Dalla opposite to Rangoon, where Lieutenant Isaack, of the 8th Madras native infantry, in command of the post, was shot, as he advanced to drive them out; the town of Dalla was, in consequence, destroyed.

The check sustained by the Burmas on the 1st had not altered their plans, and they continued gathering strength in front of the lines, and occasioning constant annoyance. It again, therefore, became necessary to repel them to a greater distance, and on the 8th, a column about twelve hundred strong, under Brigadier-general Macbean, moved out to operate by land, whilst Brigadier-general Sir A. Campbell, with another division of eight hundred, proceeded by water. The boats with the *Larne* and several of the Company's cruisers advanced to a place where the Lyne river, or branch of the Irawadi, falls into the Rangoon branch, and at the point of their junction, termed Pagoda-point, they found the enemy strongly posted. The main entrenchment was constructed on the projecting tongue of land at the junction of the two rivers, whilst

two other stockades, one on either bank of the Rangoon river, about eight hundred yards below the confluence, commanded the approach, and afforded mutual support. Notwithstanding these formidable dispositions, the post was soon carried. A breach having been effected by the fire of the vessels, a gun-brig, and three cruisers, under the command of Captain Marryat, of the Royal Navy, the troops consisting of the Madras infantry, supported by part of his Majesty's 41st and the Madras European regiment, landed and stormed the first stockade; the second was carried by escalade, and the enemy abandoned the third. Brigadier-general Macbean, supported by Brigadier McCreagh, was equally successful. The column moved from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda upon Kamaroot, upon the Lyne river, about six miles from Rangoon, and a mile and a-half above its junction with the Rangoon branch. The denseness of the forest rendered it impossible to drag forward the field ordnance, and it was sent back, with exception of some small howitzers; and the march was further retarded by heavy rain. Upon clearing the thicket the column arrived on the borders of a plain, where they could distinguish a series of seven stockades

filled with men. Notwithstanding the extreme fatigue which they had undergone, the troops under General Macbean's command, headed by the 13th and 38th under Majors Sale and Frith, maintained their character for determined courage, and pressed forward and carried by escalade the two nearest of the stockades; the enemy, driven from the exterior defences, fell back upon the central position, consisting of three strong entrenchments within each other, in the innermost of which Thamba Woongyee, who commanded, had taken his station, and endeavoured to animate his men to resistance, not only by his exhortation, but example. This conduct, so contrary to the usual practice of the Burman chiefs, who are rarely even present in an engagement which they direct, was equally unavailing, and served only to add his death to that of his followers. Another leader of rank fell also on this occasion, in a personal contest with Major Sale, who, in every attack, had distinguished himself by his personal intrepidity, and who engaged in this encounter to rescue a soldier, who had fallen beneath the sword of the Burman chief, and was about to become the victim of his revenge. The capture of so many stockades by so inferior a

force, and without any assistance from artillery, was an achievement unsurpassed during the war, and first made a profound impression upon the minds of the enemy, who henceforward learnt to think themselves insecure within the strongest defences. The business was accomplished also with a trifling loss on the part of the assailants, whilst eight hundred of the Burmas were left dead in the stockade, and numbers of their wounded were left to perish in the surrounding jungle, or adjacent villages.

The inundated state of the country now precluded the possibility of undertaking any movements of importance, but the period was not suffered to pass unimproved. Information being received of the assemblage of a force at Kykloo, Sir A. Campbell despatched a column of one thousand and two hundred men against them by land, on the 19th July, whilst he himself, with six hundred more, proceeded up the Puzendown creek in boats to the same point. The land column was unable to make good its advance, and the division by water, deprived of its expected co-operation, returned to head-quarters, having on the way seen only a few flying parties of the enemy, and liberated several families, in-

habitants of Rangoon. It was satisfactory also, to find an indication of reviving confidence in the appearance of the population of the villages, who, although they had fled on the advance of the detachment, gathered courage to return to their homes by the time of its return, and saluted it as it passed.

The head man of the district of Siriam, near the junction of the Pegu with the Rangoon river, having collected, in obedience to the orders of his government, a considerable force, and being actively engaged in constructing works to command the entrance into the river, the commander-in-chief undertook to dislodge him, and embarked on the 4th of August on board a flotilla for that purpose, with about six hundred men, consisting of part of His Majesty's 41st, the Madras European regiment, and 12th Madras infantry, under the command of Brigadier Smelt. The Burmas, it was found, had taken post within the walls of the old Portuguese fortified factory at Siriam, having cleared the jungle from its surface, filled up the chasms with palisades, and mounted guns upon the ramparts. As the troops advanced to storm they were received with a brisk fire, but the enemy had not resolu-

tion to await an escalade: they fled towards a pagoda in the vicinity, and were pursued by a detachment under Lieutenant-colonel Kelly. The pagoda also was guarded and mounted with guns, but after a hasty fire its defenders abandoned the post with precipitation, leaving the assailants in possession of the temple.

Reports having reached Sir A. Campbell, that much dissatisfaction had been excited in the district of Dalla, by the orders of the court for a general conscription, a force of four hundred men was embarked under Lieutenant-colonel Kelly and despatched on the 8th of August, to take advantage of any opportunity that might offer of giving support to the discontented. The party entered a large creek about two miles from the mouth of which they came upon a couple of stockades, one on either bank, which they landed to storm. In consequence of the difficulty of getting through the mud, they were exposed for some time to the enemy's fire, and suffered some loss. Here, however, as in the preceding instance, the entrenchments were carried as soon as the escalade was attempted, and the Burmas immediately fled into the neighbouring jungle.

In the beginning of August, Major Canning, the political agent, who had been some time ill of fever, went on board the *Nereide*, in order to return to Bengal for the recovery of his health: he died shortly after his arrival in Calcutta.

In the impossibility that existed of engaging in any active operations in the direction of Ava, it was judged advisable to employ part of the force in reducing some of the maritime provinces of the Burman kingdom. The district of Tenasserim, comprising the divisions of Tavoy and Mergui, was that selected for attack, as containing a valuable tract of sea coast, as well as being likely to afford supplies of cattle and grain. Accordingly, an expedition was detached against those places, consisting of details of his Majesty's 89th and the 7th Madras native infantry, with several cruisers and gun-brigs, under command of Lieutenant-colonel Miles. They sailed from Rangoon on the 20th August, and reached the mouth of the river leading to Tavoy, on the 1st September: some difficulty occurred in working up the river, in consequence of which, the vessels arrived off the town only on the eighth. A conspiracy amongst the garrison facilitated the capture of the place, the second in command

making the Maiwoon and his family prisoners, delivered them to the British officer, and the town was occupied without opposition. At Mergui, whither the armament next proceeded, and where it arrived on the 6th October, a more effective resistance was offered: a heavy fire was opened from the batteries of the town, which was returned by the cruisers with such effect as to silence it in about an hour. The troops then landed, and, after wading through miry ground between the river and a strong stockade which defended the town, and being exposed to a brisk fire from the enemy, they advanced to the stockade, and escaladed in the most gallant style. The enemy fled. The town, when first occupied, was deserted, but the people soon returned, and both here and at Tavoy, showed themselves perfectly indifferent to the change of authorities. After leaving a sufficient garrison of the native troops and part of the flotilla, Colonel Miles returned with the European portion of his division to Rangoon in November, in time to take a part in the more important operations about to occur.

In the end of August, and throughout September, nothing of any importance took place: the Burmas continued in force about Pagoda-

sition to encounter beyond the ineffective fire of the ill-constructed and worse-managed artillery of the Burman force. The absence of opposition, notwithstanding the strength of the post, and the encouraging presence of officers of high rank, clearly showed the impression made upon the Burmas by the intrepidity of the British troops. The first lessons they received, were finally confirmed by the daring escalade of the seven stockades at Kamaroot, on the 8th July, by the troops, under Brigadier Macbean; and from that moment, although they might be induced to keep up a fire from behind their pallisades, and to evince considerable determination against the sipahis alone, they never offered any effective opposition to British troops in the storm, and rarely, if ever, awaited the consequence of an escalade.

Nor were the Burmas suffered to indulge in the idea of the impregnability of the Kykloo stockades, as, on the same day that Colonel Smith's detachment returned to head quarters, Brigadier M'Creagh was sent, with a combined force of Europeans and natives, to attack the post. He arrived at the entrenchments on the 11th, but the enemy had deserted them, and

fallen back to one said to be of still greater strength. Colonel McCreagh, accordingly, advanced, and overtook the Burman force in their entrenchments at a considerable village, but they again fled and dispersed in all directions, after setting the village and stockade on fire. After further destroying the works, the detachment returned to Kykloo, and thence to Rangoon. On their advance, they had an opportunity of witnessing the barbarous character of the enemy, many of the bodies of the sipahis and pioneers who fell in the former attack, having been fastened to the trunks of trees, and mutilated by imbecile and savage exasperation.

The rains which had intermitted in October, returned with unusual violence in the beginning of November, and prevented the continuance of active operations as well as retarded the convalesence of the sick: scarcely thirteen hundred Europeans were fit for duty, and although the native regiments suffered less severely, they were also greatly enfeebled; the prospect of improved weather and more wholesome supplies kept up the spirits of the men, and they looked forward with impatience to the resumption of hostilities. On their side, the Burmas were not idle. The successive cap-

ture of the strongest stockades, the discomfiture of every attack, and the prolonged occupation of Rangoon, had begun, in the estimation of the Burmas themselves, to change the character of the war, and to inspire the court of Ava with uneasiness and alarm. Ascribing, however, the impunity of the invaders to the want of energy in their generals, rather than to any inferiority in arms, the court still looked with some confidence to the effect of the measure which had been adopted at an early period, of recalling Bundoola and his victorious army from Arakan. That chief, as we have already noticed, withdrew his troops from Ramoo in July and sending his army in detached parties across the mountains towards Sembewghewn and Prome, with instructions to assemble at Donabew, repaired to Ava to receive the rewards and commands of his prince. No pains nor expense were spared to equip this favourite general for the field, and by the approach of the season for active exertions, it was estimated that fifty thousand men were collected for the advance upon Rangoon, who were to exterminate the invaders, or carry them captives to the capital, where the chiefs were already calculating on the number of slaves who were, from this source of

supply, to swell their train. Reports of the return of the Arakan army soon reached Rangoon, but some period elapsed before any certainty of its movements was obtained. By the end of November, an intercepted despatch from Bundoola to the governor of Martaban, removed all doubt, and announced the departure of the former from Prome, at the head of a formidable host. His advance was hailed with delight, and preparations were made immediately for his reception.

Before we advert, however, to the results of the conflict, it will be convenient to notice some other occurrences which took place in the interval, connected with the general course of the war in this direction. In the course of September, the Company's cruiser, *Hastings*, stationed off Cheduba, had made several reconnoisances of the large and neighbouring island of Ramree, and cut off several of the enemy's war-boats. In the beginning of October Lieutenant-colonel Hampton, commanding on Cheduba, detached a party of two hundred men, who, with a part of the crew of the *Hastings*, landed on the island and destroyed some stockades: nothing further was attempted. A more important measure was the capture of Martaban, a large town on the

north bank of the Sanluen river near its debouche, by Colonel Godwin, who was detached on this duty in the end of October, with part of his Majesty's 41st foot, the 3rd regiment of Madras native infantry, and Madras artillery, under convoy of his Majesty's ships *Arachne* and *Sophia.* They reached Martaban on the 29th November: the place was found to be of considerable strength, and was at first warmly defended by Maha Udina, the governor, a bold and active chief. After a mutual cannonade, the troops were landed under a heavy fire from the enemy, who as usual did not await the effects of the storm, but evacuated the entrenchments as soon as the British entered. The town was at first deserted, but the inhabitants, chiefly Talains or natives of Pegu, gradually returned, and the post was occupied by a British detachment throughout the remainder of the war. Towards the end of November also Lieutenant-colonel Mallett was detached to display the British flag in old Pegu, which was effected without opposition, and the division returned to head quarters in time to take part in the brilliant operations of the ensuing month.

The concentrated effort to which the energies

and expectations of the government of Ava had been for some time directed was at length made, and the first half of December was the season of a series of operations which showed by the perseverance of the Burman generals, how much they had at stake. The grand army, which had been sedulously forming along the course of the Irawady, and which had been gradually approaching the British lines now ventured seriously to invest them. The force was estimated at sixty thousand men of whom more than half were armed with muskets, the rest with swords and spears; a considerable number of jinjals, carrying balls of from six to twelve ounces, and a body of seven hundred Casay horse were attached to the force, whilst a numerous flotilla of war-boats and fire-rafts proceeded along the stream. No opposition was made to the advance of the enemy to the immediate proximity of Rangoon, which took place on the 1st December, and encouraged by this seeming timidity, as well as inspired by the confidence that they were now to exterminate their invaders, they formed a regular investment of the British lines, extending in a semicircle from Dalla, opposite to Rangoon, round by Kemendine and the great

ment of the 28th Madras native infantry. With these exceptions, and the reply to the enemy's fire by the artillery, nothing was attempted for a few days, in order to encourage the Burman generals to trust themselves completely within the reach of the British army.

Between the 1st and the 5th of December, the Burmas accordingly advanced their entrenchments with incessant activity close to the principal points of the British lines. On the north of the great Pagoda, they occupied some high ground within musket shot, separated from the temple by the reservoir, known by the name of the Scotch tank. They thence formed at a right angle, facing the eastern front of the temple, to the vicinity of a morass, beyond which their lines proceeded parallel with those of the British, nearly to the Puzendown creek, and at their southern extremity, within gun-shot of Rangoon. From these positions, they kept up a constant fire upon the Pagoda and the advanced picquets, and made it dangerous for the men to show themselves beyond the defences. On the opposite side of the river, they cannonaded the shipping with little intermission, whilst at the post of Kemendine scarcely any respite was given to

the garrison, and frequent fire-rafts were launched against the vessels in the river. Little harm was effected by this show of activity, but as the Burman force could no longer be permitted to harass the troops with impunity, and it was now impossible for them to escape from the consequences of a defeat, the commander-in-chief resolved to become the assailant, and terminate the expectations in which they had hitherto been permitted to indulge.

With this view, on the 5th December, a division of the flotilla and gun-boats, under Captain Chads, was ordered up the Puzendown creek, which cannonaded the enemy in flank, and drew off their attention in that quarter! at the same time two columns of attack were formed to advance from the Rangoon side, one eight hundred strong, under Major Sale, and the other of five hundred, under Major Walker, of the Madras service. A party of the Governor-General's body-guard, which had arrived on the preceding evening, was attached to Major Sale's column. The columns advanced at seven o'clock: that under Major Walker first came in contact with the enemy, who, at first, offered some resistance, but the entrenchment being carried at the point of the bayonet, they quickly broke and retreated.

to their cantonments at Gohati, Burman parties re-occupied the stations of Kaliabur, Raha Chokey, and Noagong, levying heavy contributions on the people, and pillaging the country. They even carried their incursions into the neighbouring states, and devastated the frontier districts of the British ally and dependant, the raja of Jyntea. The renewal of operations in this quarter, therefore, commenced with their expulsion once more from these positions. The force under Lieutenant-colonel Richards, who had been continued in the command, and had been instructed to clear Asam of the Burmas during the ensuing campaign, consisted of the 46th and 57th regiments of native infantry, the Rungpoor and Dinapore local battalions, and the Champaran light infantry with details of artillery and flotilla, and a detachment of irregular horse, amounting altogether to about three thousand men; a corps more than adequate for the purposes it was directed to effect, being fully equal, if not superior, to the aggregate of the Burman troops in Asam, and infinitely superior in equipment and efficiency.

The numbers of the army, and the necessity of recourse to water-carriage, preventing the forward movement of the whole body at an early

period, Colonel Richards detached two divisions about the end of October, 1824, to put a stop to the exactions and excesses of the Burmas. Major Waters, with a flotilla, and part of the Dinapur battalion, was directed to proceed to Raha Chowkey and Noagong, and the other boats, with one wing of the Chumparun light infantry, with four guns, under Major Cooper, advanced to Kaliabur. The latter arrived at Kaliabur on the 29th October, surprising a small party of Burmas on his route, who were dispersed with the loss of one of their chiefs, and the capture of another. Major Waters also, on his way. dislodged a party from the village of Hathgaon, and on his arrival at Raha Chowkey, on the 3rd of November, took the party stationed there by surprise. They were scattered about in the houses of the village, and in their attempt to escape from one of the columns into which Major Waters had divided his force, fell upon the other, by which many were killed. A small body which had been detached to reconnoitre, returning in ignorance of these transactions, was, on the following day, drawn into an ambuscade, and nearly half destroyed. In these affairs, the completeness of the success was not more owing to the steady

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on the road to Jorehat. Colonel Richards
diately detached a company from the 1st
iment, under Lieut. Jones, of that corps. The
ceeded, under the guidance of Lieut. Neil
the spot, but unluckily, the enemy were
on the move, and only a few of their straggl
were seen and pursued without effect.

Having afterwards received intelligence that
two parties were in the hills to the eastward
one of which, at Kaleana, was considerably
his rear, Colonel Richards determined to
to dislodge them, as, if allowed to remain,
would have it in their power to command the
road between his force and Kalahar, and cut off
its supplies, besides deterring the inhabitants
from returning to their homes. The enemy
being reported also to have parties in stockaded

29th. The approach of the capital had been fortified by the enemy; a stockade had been drawn across the road, the left of which was strengthened by an entrenched tank, a little way in front, and the right was within gun-shot of the fort: the position mounted several guns, and was defended by a strong party. On approaching the defences, the assailants were saluted by a heavy fire, which brought down half the leading division, and caused a momentary check: a couple of shells, and a round or two of grape having been thrown in, the column again advanced, and the stockade was escaladed and carried by the right wing of the 57th regiment, under Captain Martin, supported by the 46th. The tank on the right was also occupied, and two temples, one on the right and the other on the left, were taken possession of, by which the south side of the fort was completely invested, and the enemy were driven in at all points. In this action, Lieutenant-Colonel Richards and Lieutenant Brooke were wounded; the former slightly, the latter severely; the number of wounded was considerable, but the loss in killed was of little amount.

The result of these two engagements not only dispirited the Burmas, but gave renewed in-

veteracy to the divisions that prevailed amongst them. The two chiefs, the Sam and Bagli Phokuns, were willing to stipulate for terms; but the more numerous party, headed by the subordinate chiefs, were resolutely bent on resistance, and threatened the advocates of pacific measures with extermination. The latter, however, so far prevailed, as to dispatch a messenger to the British Commander, a Bauddha priest, a native of Ceylon, but brought up in Ava, Dhermadhar Brahmachari, to negociate terms for the surrender of Rungpore, and they were finally agreed upon through his mediation. Such of the garrison as continued hostile, were allowed to retire into the Burman territory, on their engaging to abstain from any act of aggression on their retreat, and those who were pacifically inclined, were suffered to remain unmolested, with their families and property: their final destination to await the decision of the Governor-General's agent; but in the event of peace with Ava, they were not to be given up to that government. Colonel Richards was induced to accede to these conditions, by his conviction of the impossibility of preventing the escape of the garrison, upon the capture of the fort, or of pursuing them on their flight. It was also to

have been apprehended, if the evacuation of the province had been much longer delayed, that it might not have been cleared of the enemy during the campaign, as the want of carriage and supplies would have detained the army some time at Rungpore, and might have delayed its movements till the season was too far advanced to admit of its progress far beyond the capital. By the occupation of Rungpore on the terms granted, much time was saved, as well as some loss of lives avoided; and the object of the campaign, the expulsion of the Burmas from Asam, without the fear of their renewing their irruptions with any success, was peaceably and promptly secured. The persons that surrendered themselves, by virtue of these stipulations, were Sam Phokun and about seven hundred of the garrison; the rest, about nine thousand, of both sexes and all ages, including two thousand fighting men, withdrew to the frontiers; but many dropped off on the retreat, and established themselves in Asam.

The surrender of Rungpore, and the dispersion of the Burmas, terminated the regular campaign on the north-eastern frontier; but the state of anarchy into which Asam had fallen, and the lawless conduct of the Singhpho, and other wild

tribes, inhabiting its eastern portion, continued to demand the active interference of British detachments throughout the remainder of the season. The Burmas also appeared in some force, in May, at Beesa Gaon, a Singhpho village, on the right bank of the Nao Dehing, where they erected a stockade; they also advanced to Duffa Gaon, a similar village, a few miles inland from the same river, about ten miles to the north of the former, where they entrenched themselves. The force at these posts consisted of about one thousand men, of whom six hundred were Burmas, the rest Singhphos, under the command of the governor of Mogaum. From these stations they were dislodged in the middle of June, by a party of the 57th native infantry, under Lieutenants Neufville and Kerr, after a march of great exertion and fatigue. At Beesa Gaon, the stockades were five in number, and were carried at the point of the bayonet: the enemy at first formed in front of the stockades, as if determined to offer a resolute resistance; but they retreated precipitately before the charge of the British detachment, who following them as quickly as the preservation of order, and the nature of the ground would permit, drove them out of each stockade in rapid succession, without

firing a shot: on quitting the last entrenchment, the Burmas fled towards their frontier, but their retreat was pursued by a party under Ensign Bogle, and they were so closely pressed, that they were obliged to abandon several hundred Asamese, whom they were carrying off as slaves.

The plan of operations on the Sylhet frontier, during the campaign of 1825, comprised the march of a considerable force through Kachar into Manipur, whence an impression might be made on the territory of Ava, or at least the anxious attention of the court be drawn to its frontier in that direction. With these views, a force of about seven thousand men was collected under Brigadier Shuldham, who was appointed to command the eastern frontier. The army consisted of six regiments of infantry, the 7th, 44th, and 45th native infantry, forming the 3rd brigade, and the 14th, 39th and 52nd regiments native infantry, brigaded as the 4th brigade, two companies of artillery, four of pioneers, the Sylhet local corps, a corps of cavalry, Blair's irregular horse, and a body of Kacharis and Manipuris about five hunhundred strong, under raja Gambhir Singh.

At an early period after the rains had ceased, a reconnoisance was made by Brigadier Innes,

of the positions which the Burmas had occupied throughout the season at Talain, and which they had now abandoned, after sustaining a considerable reduction of their force by the unhealthiness of the climate and the insufficiency of supplies. There was nothing, therefore, to apprehend from the enemy on the advance to Manipur, nor was it probable that they were to be found there in any strength: the defence of Arakan and the Irawadi furnishing ample employment for the resources of Ava. Although, however, hostile opposition was not to be dreaded, the face of the country to be traversed and its utter unproductiveness, offered obstacles equally serious, and which proved insurmountable to a numerous and heavily-equipped army. From Bhadrapur to Banskandy, a road was speedily made by the exertions of the pioneers, on which General Shuldham, with the artillery and the third brigade advanced to Doodpatlee, there to await the further operations of the pioneers, and the arrival of carriage cattle and provisions. Captain Dudgeon, with the Sylhet local corps, Gambhir's levy, and a wing of Blair's horse was sent in advance to cover the pioneers. The country from Banskandy towards Manipur was a continual series of ascents and descents, the

route being intersected at right angles by ridges of mountains running nearly due north and south, the base of one springing from the foot of the other, with the intervention only of a mountain rivulet swollen into a deep and precipitous river after every shower: for the first thirty miles, also, the sides of the mountains were completely covered with a thick forest, the intervals between the trees of which were filled up with a network of intertwining reeds and brushwood, except where a narrow and often interrupted foot path wound through the labyrinth. The soil was a soft alluvial mould, converted by the slightest rain into a plashy mire, and to aggravate all these difficulties, frequent and heavy showers commenced early in February, and continued with slight occasional intermission until the proximity of the rainy season rendered the attempt to reach Manipur hopeless.

During the whole of February, the pioneers, assisted by a few of the mountaineers, some coolies from Sylhet, and working parties from the local corps, contrived, with immense labour, to open a pathway through the forest, to the banks of the Jiri nullah, about forty miles from Banskandy, but the nature of the soil, and the state of the

weather, rendered their success of little avail, as the road continued impassable for guns and loaded cattle. In the attempts to move forward, and in the conveyance of supplies to the pioneers and the advanced guard, several hundred bullocks perished, a great number of camels were destroyed, and many elephants were lost, both by the fatigue they underwent, and by their dislocating their limbs as they laboured through the mire, or by their becoming so deeply plunged into it, that no efforts could extricate them. After struggling against these physical obstructions in vain, through February and March, General Shuldham reported the impracticability of the advance to Manipur, in consequence of which the attempt was abandoned, and the force broken up. The head-quarters were removed to Dacca, a force under Brigadier-general Donkin was posted at Sylhet, and the two corps of native infantry, with the Sylhet local corps, and the Manipur levy, were left in Kachar.

That the difficulties which had thus arrested the progress of a heavy body encumbered by baggage and artillery, were not insurmountable to a small force differently organised, was very speedily established, and the Burmas were driven

out of Manipur by a corps attached to the invading army, on the strength of which it was scarcely enumerated. At his earnest solicitation, Gambhir Singh was allowed to undertake the recovery of his ancestral possessions with his own levy, formed of five hundred Manipuris and Kacharis, armed by the British government, but wholly undisciplined. Lieutenant Pemberton volunteered to accompany the raja. They left Sylhet on the 17th May, and did not reach Banskandy till the 23rd, the direct road being impassable, in consequence of heavy rain, which compelled them to make a circuitous detour. They again started with the levy on the 25th, and after a march of great difficulty and privation, chiefly owing to repeated falls of rain, which compelled them to halt several days together, they gained the western boundary of the valley of Manipur on the 10th of June. In the town of Manipur, and at two villages in advance, they found the Burmas posted, but the enemy retreated to a village called Undra, about ten miles to the south. The raja and Lieutenant Pemberton advanced to attack them, but they again fled, and information was shortly afterwards received, that they had evacuated the province. The season of the year

and the want of supplies rendering the valley of Manipur equally untenable for friend or foe, Gambhir Singh, leaving a division of his levy, and a body of armed inhabitants to defend the chief town, returned with Lieutenant Pemberton to Sylhet, where they arrived on the 22nd June, having in this manner accomplished one of the objects of the campaign, and, with a few hundred undisciplined mountaineers, cleared Manipur of the enemy.

An effort on a still more extensive scale than the armament on the Sylhet frontier formed part of the plan of this campaign, and important results were expected to follow the employment of a powerful force on the side of Arakan. With this intention, an army of about eleven thousand men was assembled at Chittagong in the end of September; it was formed of his Majesty's 44th and 54th regiments, the 26th, 42nd, 49th, and 62nd Bengal native infantry; the 10th and 16th regiments Madras native infantry, the Mug levy, and a body of local horse with details of pioneers and artillery, and was placed under the command of brigadier-general Morrison, of his Majesty's service: a flotilla of pilot vessels and gun-brigs was attached to it, under the direction of Commodore Hayes,

estuary of above ten miles in breadth; at a short distance from the mouth of the Meyu, a creek running north of Akyab, formed a communication between the two streams, opening into the Oreatung at a point marked by the site of a pagoda, and opposite to a similar channel which led to the spot chosen for the encampment, Chang Krein Island, a part of the country, insulated like many others in its vicinity, by the innumerable communicating and intersecting ramifications of the rivers and creeks. The gunboats, with other boats and rafts, having joined on the 27th February, the force was gradually transported across the Meyu and along the canals above described, to Chang Krein Island, where a sufficient force for forward movements was collected on the 20th of March; nearly a month having elapsed since the arrival of the force at the mouth of the Meyu. From Chang Krein, the main body was advanced on the 20th of March a short distance to Kay Krang Dong, while the right pushed forward five miles to Natonguay, to cover the working parties employed in rendering the nullahs passable, and the left remained in position at Chang Krein, threatening some stockades at Kheoung Pala, or Chambala, which had

been the scene of a temporary check to the marine division of the invading force. Commodore Hayes having entered the great Arakan river on the 22nd February, received information which induced him to believe that the principal Mug chieftains were confined at Chambala, a stockade garrisoned by about one thousand men, half a tide from the capital, and concluding that their liberation would prove of essential service to the advancing army, he determined upon attacking the work. Accordingly, on the 23rd, he stood up the channel leading from the Oreatung river to Arakan, with the *Research*, *Vestal*, and several gun-vessels, having on board one company of his Majesty's 54th regiment. At two P. M. they came in sight of the enemy's works at Kheoung Pala, which immediately opened a heavy fire upon the *Gunga Saugor* and *Vestal*, the headmost vessels. The *Research* getting within half pistol shot, commenced a cannonade and fire of musketry upon the stockade and breast-work, which was returned by the enemy with great regularity and spirit. On ranging to the northern end of the stockade, with intent to anchor and flank it, as well as to allow the other vessels to come into action, the

these the ground was again clear and open, not only to the fire of the defenders, but to the large stones which they precipitated upon the assailants who attempted to scale the summit.

The first attempt to carry the position was by a direct attack upon the pass, and the division appointed to the duty was placed under command of Brigadier-general Macbean. The assault was led by the light infantry company of his Majesty's 54th, four companies of the 2nd light infantry battalion, and the light companies of the 10th and 16th Madras native infantry, with the rifle company of the Mug levy, under Major Kemm, and supported by six companies of the 16th Madras native infantry, under Captain French. Notwithstanding the utmost gallantry of the troops, the attempt to escalade failed, in consequence of the steepness of the ascent, and the well-directed fire and incessant rain of stones which knocked down the assailants as fast as they approached the top of the pass. After a fruitless struggle, in which the sipahis and Europeans vied with each other in the display of cool and determined courage, every officer being disabled, and Captain French, of the 16th Madras native infantry, killed, the

troops were recalled, and the force took up a position for the rest of the day.

Having determined, in consequence of the failure of this attempt, and the nearer observation of the enemy's defences, to attack them on their right, as the key to their position, whilst their attention should be drawn by a continued fire to their front, the 30th of March was spent in the construction of a battery, to play especially upon the works commanding the pass, and on the 31st, at day light the guns opened, and maintained during the day, a heavy cannonade, which had the effect of checking, though not silencing the enemy's fire. At about eight in the evening, Brigadier Richards moved off with six companies of his Majesty's 44th, three of the 26th, and three of the 49th native infantry, thirty seamen, under Lieutenant Armstrong of the *Research*, and thirty dismounted troopers of Gardener's horse.

Although there was moonlight, yet it was evident from the silence of the Burmas, that the movement from the camp had not been detected from the heights. The hill was nearly five hundred feet high, but the road by which the party ascended was winding and precipitous,

and an anxious interval elapsed before it could be known that the undertaking had succeeded. At last, a few minutes after eleven, a shot from the hill proclaimed that the enemy had discovered the advance of the assailants. The whole camp was in a moment on foot: a yell or two from the Burmese was followed by a sharp fire for a very short period, and then the drums and fifes of the detachment proclaimed that the point was carried, even before the preconcerted signal by rockets had been given.

On the following morning, as soon as a six-pounder, carried up the hill with some difficulty, had been brought to bear upon the enemy, Brigadier Richards advanced to the assault of the entrenchments on the adjacent height, whilst a simultaneous movement of the advance, under Brigadier-general Macbean, was again directed against the pass from below. The enemy, apparently panic-struck, abandoned the hills after a feeble resistance, and the capital of Arakan was in possession of the British force. The loss in these subsequent operations was inconsiderable.

Arakan stands upon a plain, generally of rocky ground, surrounded by hills and traversed by

a narrow tide nulla, towards which there is a prevailing slope. On the northern face, another nulla intervenes between the wall of the fort and the hills, and both these streams unite a little below the Baboo Dong hill, through the rocky fissures of which they rush, at low water, with the velocity and noise of a rapid. The space on which the town stands is not an absolute square, nor are the hills arranged with rectilinear regularity; but allowing for the ruggedness of the natural outline, and supposing the surface to be sprinkled with a few detached and separate little eminences, a tolerably accurate idea of the situation of the place may be formed. The fort stands at the north-west corner of the space above described. It consists of three concentric walls, with intervening spaces between the third and second, and the second and inner wall, which forms the citadel. These walls are of considerable thickness and extent, constructed with large stones, and with a degree of labour such as a powerful state alone could have commanded. Where the masonry is dilapidated, the interstices have, by the Burmas, been filled up with piles of timber. This interior work is comparatively trifling to that by which in former days

the defects in the circumvallation of hills appear to have been supplied. At every point, where the continuity of their natural outline is broken artificial embankments faced with masonry, some of a very great height, connect them with each other, and the excavations whence the materials were quarried, have now formed into what resemble large natural ponds. The Burman entrenchments merely followed and took advantage of this ancient line of defensive outworks. The extent of the circumference is nearly nine miles. At the gateways the stone walls appear to have been of considerable elevation and great solidity, but where the steepness or altitude of the hill rendered artificial defences of less importance, a low wall of brick or stone has been carried along the summit. These defences are said to have been constructed several centuries ago.

All the hills and hillocks contiguous to the town are surmounted by pagodas, which, by their pointed tops, resembling spires, give the place something of a town-like appearance; but, with the exception of these edifices, and the walls of the fort, its palaces and its huts were all of the same materials—bamboos, timber, straw, and mats, with not a single stone or brick building

among them. The number of houses in the town was said to have been eighteen thousand, but half had been destroyed by fire. The greater part of the population had abandoned the place on its first occupation, but speedily returned to their homes, and showed themselves well satisfied with the change of their government.

The first days after taking possession of the town were occupied in preparing for further operations: the nature of the country defeated one object of the attack from the eastward, and assisted the Burman force to effect their escape, although in small scattered parties, across the low lands between the capital and the mountains, and across the latter to Chalain by the passes from Talak and Aeng. Two of the four provinces of Arakan, or Arakan and Cheduba, were therefore cleared of the enemy, and it only remained to dislodge them from the remaining divisions of Chynda (or Sandoway) and Ramree, for which purpose a part of the force, under Brigadier-general Macbean was despatched on the 8th of April.

We have already seen that the Burman posts on Ramree were kept on the alert by the troops at Cheduba, under Lieutenant-colonel Hampton, and the crews of the *Hastings* frigate and gun-

planted across the river in various places, and several stockades were observed, but there was no appearance of the enemy, who had withdrawn from all their positions in Arakan upon hearing of the downfal of the capital.

The entire occupation of the province of Arakan thus fulfilled one chief object of the expedition, and, in as far as it excited the apprehensions of the Burman court, of an invasion in that direction, proved a seasonable diversion in favour of the Rangoon force. It was not found practicable, however, to carry into effect the other main purpose of the force, a junction across the mountains with Sir Archibald Campbell. Several reconnoisances were made, with the view of determining the practicability of a route across the mountains, but they failed to afford satisfactory information.

Little was to be apprehended from the enemy until near the Burman boundary. They had retreated over the mountains with great precipitation, losing great numbers by the way from want, fatigue, and conflicts with the mountaineers. At Chalain, in the Ava country, they halted, and whilst the chiefs, the Atwen Woon Moungza and the viceroy Toroo-wyne, proceeded to the capital,

an officer of high military repute, Maha Mengyee Thilwa, assumed the command with considerable reinforcements. The chief impediments, however, were of a physical character, and consisted in the face of the country and the change of the season. Above eighty miles of a low jungly tract, crossed by numerous rivulets, intervened between the capital and Talak, at the foot of the mountainous ridge which separates Arakan from Ava. It thence passed, for ninety miles more, over lofty and rugged precipices, where no supplies could be expected, and even water was scarce, and which could be rendered practicable for guns and baggage only by great effort and with considerable delay. A force was formed of the light companies of his Majesty's 44th and 45th, and 16th Madras infantry, and three companies of the 2nd Bengal light infantry, and placed under the command of Major Bucke, to explore this route in pursuit of the enemy. They proceed to Talak by water, and thence made four marches over the mountains, in which the men and cattle underwent extreme fatigue. When arrived at Akowyn, within one stage of Tantabain, on the Burman frontier, they learned that the Burmas were there in strength, and the exhausted state of the de-

tachment, and the impracticable nature of the route, induced Major Bucke to retrace his steps and return to Talak. At a more favourable season the route might have been traversed by the army, but it was now too late, and at any time would have been a work of much difficulty. A much more practicable road across the mountains by Aeng, was not attempted till the end of the war, but it would not have been of much avail for the passage of the troops had its existence been known earlier, as none of the carriage cattle of the army had crossed the Meyu river in June, and some were even then to the north of the Naf. Even their presence would not have enabled the army to advance, as the rains set in early in May, and precluded all possibility of military operations. The season also brought with it, its usual pestiferous influence, in the midst of a low country overrun with jungle, and intersected by numerous shallow and muddy rivers. Notwithstanding the precautions that had been taken in the timely cantonment of the troops at Arakan, fever and dysentry broke out among them to an alarming extent, and with the most disastrous results. That the unavoidable privations of troops on service tended to aggravate the severity of the complaints, was a

necessary occurrence; but all ranks were equally affected, and a large proportion of officers fell victims to the climate. Brigadier-general Morrison himself, after struggling through the campaign against it, was obliged to quit the country, and died on his way to Europe. The maladies were so universal, and the chance of subduing them so hopeless, that the Government of Bengal was at last impelled to the necessity of recalling the troops altogether, leaving divisions of them on the islands of Cheduba and Ramree, and the opposite coast of Sandoway, where the climate appeared to be not unfavourable to their health.[13]

From these transactions, we return to the operations of the army at Rangoon.

The capture of the stockades at Kokain on the 15th of December, was followed by the complete dispersion of the Burman army, and the exertions of the chiefs were vainly directed to its re-organization. Two or three small bodies were thus assembled on the Lyne river, at Mophi and Panlang, whilst Maha Bundoola retreated to Donabew, where he exercised his utmost efforts, and ultimately with some success, to concentrate a respectable force, which he strongly intrenched.

The victory produced also a change in the sentiments of the enemy, and a letter was addressed to some of the European residents at Rangoon by Maha Bundoola, which, although of a vague and indefinite character, evinced a material alteration in the temper of that chieftain, and a disposition, if not to treat for peace, to respect his antagonists. The tenor of the letter, and its address to unofficial persons, precluded its being made the basis of negociation; but a letter was written by Sir A. Campbell to the Burman commander, to point out to him the propriety of addressing the British general direct, if he had any communication to make, to which he was desirous the latter should pay regard, and assuring him that Sir A. Campbell would ever be accessible to any correspondence of an amicable purport. No notice of this letter was taken by Bundoola, and even if sincere in his first advance, the re-assembling of his forces probably encouraged him to make another appeal to the chance of war.

Having been joined by his Majesty's 47th regiment, a detachment of rocket artillery, and a division of gun-boats, Sir A. Campbell determined to make a forward movement upon Prome. In order to leave no obstruction in his rear, he

dispatched Colonel Elrington against the only remaining post in possession of the enemy, in the vicinity of Rangoon, the old Portuguese fort and the pagoda of Syriam, which had been re-occupied by part of the grand Burman army in December, and from whence they were once more driven, after a slight resistance, on the 11th February, when the army was at liberty to commence its advance.

The departure of the army from Rangoon was encouraged by the indication of favourable changes in the political situation of the country. The major part of the population in the lower districts of the Burman kingdom, are Taliens or Peguers, who, although depressed by a long course of servitude, retain the memory of their ancient greatness, and hostility to their oppressors. During the presence of the Burman force in the immediate neighbourhood, and the compulsory removal of their families, they had been obliged to avoid all communication with the British, and to desert the town; now, however, that the Burman leaders had retreated, and the army was scattered, they began to recover confidence, and join the invaders, in which they were encouraged by a proclamation issued by

Sir A. Campbell, copies of which were conveyed even into the enemy's camp at Panlang, where the greater part of the troops consisted of Peguers. The consequence was, the desertion of nearly the entire division in the direction of Dalla, and their retreat being supported by a detachment sent to their succour, they effected their escape, with their wives and their children, to Rangoon, and the population thenceforward daily and rapidly returned to its original enumeration.

During the period of Burman ascendancy, vast numbers of Peguers had sought refuge in the kingdom of Siam, and these also manifested, apparently at the suggestion of the Siamese, some inclination to come forward and join their countrymen in the Rangoon province, in an attempt to recover their political existence. Some of their chiefs addressed both the British commander and the head men of the towns and villages in Pegu, offering the assistance of the Siamese forces under their command, against the Burmans. This circumstance, and the actually existing state of hostility between the courts of Bankok and Ava, were a sufficient guarantee of the disposition of the Siamese, although, with

the timid and selfish policy of a semi-barbarous state, they were averse to committing themselves by any decided step in favour of a power, whose success they probably knew not whether to hope or fear. In further confirmation, however, of a friendly feeling, the Siamese commanders addressed a complimentary letter to Sir A. Campbell, upon the success that had attended the British arms.

On the other hand, the advance into the heart of the country was not without its unpropitious accompaniments. There was no doubt that a similar policy would be pursued in the interior that had been adopted at Rangoon, and that all the local resources would be removed beyond the reach of the invaders. It would, therefore, be necessary to maintain an uninterrupted communication with Rangoon, for which purpose a considerable force must be left there, and at different points on the line of march, and, above all, the navigation of the Irawadi was to be commanded by a numerous and well-equipped flotilla. Whatever carriage was required for the baggage, artillery and stores, was procurable only by sea from Bengal and Madras, from whence few of the class of bearers or coolies would consent to em-

of various sizes. The approach to the main structure from the south was defended by two outworks, one about four hundred yards lower down the river, and another about three hundred yards below it. Each was constructed of square beams of timber, provided with platforms and pierced for cannon, and was strengthened by an exterior fosse, the outer edge of which was guarded with sharp-pointed timbers, planted obliquely, and a thick abatis of felled trees and brushwood. The lowest outwork was a square of about two hundred yards, with a pagoda in the centre; the higher was of an irregular shape, running along the bank of a rivulet flowing into the main stream; both works were occupied by strong parties of the enemy.

Having been obliged to leave a native regiment and a detachment of Europeans as a guard to the flotilla, General Cotton had not above six hundred firelocks at his disposal; of these, five hundred were disembarked on the morning of the 7th, about a mile below the pagoda stockade, and formed into two columns, under Lieutenant-colonel Donoghue and Major Basden, with two six-pounders and a detachment of rocket artillery; after receiving and returning the enemy's

fire, the men rushed on to the stockade, and forced an entrance into it, with a determination that overpowered the resistance offered, although more resolute than had for some time been encountered. The first stockade was carried with the loss of about twenty killed and wounded. The enemy fled to the next defence, leaving two hundred and eighty prisoners in the power of the assailants.

Previously to assailing the second defence, two other six pounders, with four mortars, were brought up and placed in position, and a fresh supply of rockets was procured. The enemy remained quiet until the near approach of the storming party, when a destructive fire was opened from all parts of the face of the work, which checked the progress of the column, and inflicted so severe a loss upon them, that it became necessary to order a retreat. Captain Rose, who commanded the detachment, and Captain Cannon, of the 89th, were killed, and the greater number of the men were killed or wounded. In consequence of this failure, Brigadier-general Cotton deemed it advisable to abstain from any further attempt against the post, until joined by General Campbell, or at least reinforced; he

therefore re-embarked the men and guns, and dropped down to Yoong-yoon, to await the result of his communication with the commander of the forces.

Information of the repulse at Donabew did not reach Sir Archibald Campbell earlier than the morning of the 11th of March, when he had advanced to Yuadit about twenty-six miles above Tharawa. The necessity of vindicating the reputation of the British arms, and the dependence of the land column upon the flotilla for supplies, left the commander-in-chief no alternative but to fall back upon General Cotton's division, and concentrate his force for the reduction of the Donabew stockades. He accordingly returned to Tharawa, from which place the force had to cross the Irawadi with such scanty means as could be procured. A few small canoes were collected, and rafts were constructed, and in the course of five days, between the 13th and 18th, the passage of the whole division was completed, and the head-quarters established at Henzada. Information having been received, that the Kyee Woongyee was posted about fifteen miles from thence, to intercept the detachment expected in that direction from Bassein, a party, under Lieu-

tenant-colonel Godwin, was sent off by night to endeavour to surprise him. The alarm, however, was given in time for the Burman force to escape; bnt it was completely scattered without a contest, their commander setting the example of precipitate flight. After halting two days at Henzada, to prepare carriage for the stores, the army resumed its march along the right bank, and came before Donabew on the 25th: a communication was opened with the flotilla on the 27th, and both divisions zealously co-operated in the reduction of the place. Batteries, armed with heavy artillery, were constructed without delay. Spirited attempts to interrupt their progress were frequently made by sorties from the work; and on one occasion Bundoola ordered out his elephants, seventeen in number, each carrying a complement of armed men, and supported by a body of infantry. They were gallantly charged by the body-guard, the horse artillery, and rocket troop, and the elephant drivers being killed, the animals made off into the jungle, whilst the troops retreated precipitately within their defences, into which rockets and shells were thrown with a precision that rendered the post no refuge from danger.

found deserted, and part of it consumed: the same was the case for a considerable distance along the course of the river, the villages being everywhere abandoned and laid in ashes; but this state of things, the result partly of the fears of the people, and partly of the policy of the Burman court, was not of long continuance, and a few days sufficed to bring back the population of Prome to their dwellings. The command of the lower provinces acquired by this position, inspiring the people with confidence, they soon began to resume their usual avocations, and to form markets along the river, and especially at Prome and Rangoon, by which the resources of the country now began to be fully available for carriage and support. This was the more satisfactory, as in the commencement of May, the periodical change of seasons took place, and obliged the force to establish itself in cantonments at Prome. Previous to the setting in of the rains, the thermometer had risen in the shade to 110°, but the nights remained cool, and the climate was not found unhealthy. The monsoon brought with it its ordinary effects upon the condition of the troops, especially the Europeans who, although they suffered less severely than at Rangoon, lost

nearly one-seventh of their number between June and October. The native troops were much more exempt, although not wholly free from disease; although the level of the country was higher than in the districts nearer the sea, yet the site of the town was so low as to be under water with the rise of the river, and to the east extended for many miles a plain laid out principally in rice cultivation. South of the town was a range of low hills crowned by the principal pagodas, and to them some of the troops were removed when the suburbs in which they had been quartered, were found liable to sudden inundations: supplies were in some abundance, and there was comparatively little demand for the active services of the force: it seems probable, therefore, that much of the disease that still prevailed was the consequence of previous exposure and exhaustion, although ascribable in some measure to the effects of climate, and of ill-selected quarters for the troops.

The temporary repose enjoyed in the cantonments at Prome was, in the early part of the season, enlivened by the accounts of the success of Major Sale, in the direction of Bassein; by advice of the successful repression of the kid-

be but nominal, and the presence of an undisciplined rabble would only be formidable to the provinces now subjected to the British authority.

Immediately after the occupation of Prome, Sir A. Campbell detached Colonel Godwin with a force of eight hundred infantry, a troop of the body guard, and two field pieces, to the eastward, on the route to Tongho, the capital of the province of Tharawadi, in order to ascertain the state of the country, and the strength of the enemy in that direction. The force left Prome on the 5th of May, and marched in a north-easterly course till the 11th, when they came upon a mountainous and difficult country, beyond which apparently interminable forests extended. They then turned to the left, and moved to Meaday, sixty miles above Prome on the Irawadi, which they found deserted. They thence returned to Prome, where they arrived on the 24th. At setting out they disturbed a gang of plunderers, who fled and effected their escape, notwithstanding a party of the body guard was sent in pursuit, but no enemy was seen: the villages were all burnt, and the people living in the thickets: the intercourse held with them dissipated their alarms, and great numbers came into

Prome. A stock of cattle was collected, but no grain, and the army continued to depend upon Rangoon for its principal supplies.

The same cause that suspended the operations of the British force, arrested the activity of the court of Ava, and during this interval it was unable to send any armies into the field. The only military occurrence was the expulsion of the Thekia Woongyee, who had retreated to Old Pegu, where his force having gradually become thinned by desertion, the people themselves rose upon his detachment, and put it to the rout, taking prisoner a Burman chief of rank, whom they brought into Rangoon, and delivered to Brigadier Smith. At their request they were furnished with a small sipahi force for their defence against any attempt of the Thekia Woonygee to recover his footing in the city. The presence of this detachment, it was ascertained, gave much uneasiness to the Ava government, as supposed to indicate an advance upon Tongo, the garrison of which was accordingly reinforced.

The capture of the stockades at Donabew, and the death of Bundoola, were events that excited the utmost consternation at Ava: no person about the court ventured to communicate to the

Campbell to the ministers promised to produce the happiest effects. On the 6th September, a war-boat, with a flag of truce, arrived at Prome, and two Burman deputies, on being conducted to the British general, presented him with a letter in reply to his communication of the 6th of August. This letter purported to be from the general of the advanced army, acknowledging the petitions of the English agent and officers, and directing them, if they wanted peace, to come and solicit it. This style was not very conciliatory, but being the court language, it was not thought proper to object to it, beyond pointing out its impropriety to the deputies, and explaining to them, that although the English general was willing to meet the Burman authorities half-way, he could not condescend to seek them in their entrenchments. They admitted the force of the objection, and proposed that two officers should be deputed to the Burman commanders, which request was readily complied with, and in order that, if necessary, full powers to negociate might be obtained from Ava, the British general proposed to grant a suspension of hostilities for a term of thirty or forty days. This proposal, the deputies expressed their conviction, would be

concurred in by the Burman leaders. The deputies returned to their entrenchments on the following day, accompanied by Lieut.-colonel Tidy, deputy adjutant general, and Lieutenant Smith, of his Majesty's ship *Alligator*.

The British officers were met on their way, by a flotilla of war-boats, having on board several chiefs of rank, who escorted them to the Burman advanced cantonments, about a mile from Meaday. On their arrival there, they were received with every demonstration of respect, and conducted through a guard of two thousand men, armed with muskets, to a house prepared for their accommodation. On the following day, a deputation visited them from the Kyee-Woon-gyee, the chief in command, to assure them of his anxiety to conclude a pacific treaty; but requesting them not to urge immediate negotiation, as it would be necessary to receive instructions from Memia-Bo, who was at Melloon. The British deputies having acceded to this proposal, were treated in the interval with the greatest possible attention and kindness; no guard was set over their movements, and all comers had free access to them, which afforded them ample opportunity of learning the sentiments of indi-

viduals of every rank who were unanimous in expressing a hope that hostilities were about to cease. On the 13th of September, the officers waited, by appointment, on the Kyee-Woongyee, but the result of the interview was their assent to wait two or three days longer for the arrival of instructions. On the 16th, it was intimated to them that full powers had arrived, and on the 17th, they again visited the Kyee-Woongyee, when it was settled that the latter should meet General Campbell at Naibenzeik, a place midway between the two armies, on the 2nd of October, to discuss the conditions of peace, and, in the meantime, the terms of an armistice were agreed upon between them and the Atwen-Woon Menghie Maha Menla Raja, and Wondok Menghi Maha Senkuyah. By this stipulation, hostilities were suspended till the 17th of October; the line of demarcation was drawn from Comma, on the eastern bank of the Irawadi, through Naibenzeik to Tongo. The armistice included all the troops on the frontiers in other parts of the dominions of Ava, none of whom should make a forward movement before the 18th of October. With respect to the meeting of the 2nd of the ensuing month, it was also settled, that two

officers on either part should meet on the 23rd of September, at Naibenzeik, to determine the requisite arrangements, and as it was contrary to etiquette for the Burman minister to move with a less escort than one thousand men, half armed with muskets and half with swords, the option was given to General Campbell to be similarly attended. On the conclusion of these preliminary negotiations, Colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith returned to Prome.

On the 30th of September, the British general proceeded to Naibenzeik, assisted at his request, as commissioner, by Sir James Brisbane, commander of his Majesty's naval forces in the Indian seas, who had arrived at Rangoon, in his Majesty's ship *Tamar*, early in September, and reached Prome on the 22nd, where he assumed the direction of the operations by water. The ground was found prepared for the encampment of the respective chiefs, with their attendants, and a lotoo, or hall of audience, erected in the intermediate space, equi-distant from the British and the Burman lines. At a few minutes before two o'clock, on the 2nd of October, two Burman officers of rank arrived in the camp to conduct Sir A. Campbell to the Lotoo; Lieut.-colonel

Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R.N., were despatched at the same time to the Burman cantonment, to pay a similar compliment to the Kyee-Woongyee. At two o'clock, Major-general Sir A. Campbell and Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, accompanied by their respective suites, proceeded to the Lotoo, and met the Burman commissioners, the Kyee-Woongyee and Lamain Woon, entering the hall, arrayed in splendid state dresses. After the whole party were seated, Sir A. Campbell opened the conference with an appropriate address to the Woongyees, who replied in courteous and suitable terms, and expressed their hope that the first day of their acquaintance might be given up to private friendship, and the consideration of public business deferred until the next meeting. This was assented to, and a desultory conversation then ensued, in the course of which the Woongyees conducted themselves in the most polite and conciliatory manner, inquiring after the latest news from England, the state of the King's health, and similar topics, and offering to accompany Sir A. Campbell to Rangoon, England, or wherever he might propose.

On the following day, the appointed meeting took place, for the purpose of discussing formally

the terms of peace, at which the following officers were present on the side of the British, Major General Sir A. Campbell, Commodore Sir J. Brisbane, Brigadier-general Cotton, Captain Alexander, Brigadier McCreagh, Lieutenant-colonel Tidy, and Captain Snodgrass.

On the part of the government of Ava, the chiefs present were Sada Mengyee Maha Mengom-Kyee Woongyee, Munnoo Rutha Keogong Lamain Woon, Mengyee Maha Menla Rajah Atwenwoon, Maha Sri Senkuyah Woondok, Mengyee Maha Menla Sear Sey Shuagon Mooagoonoon, Mengyee Attala Maha Sri Soo Asseewoon.

The principal conditions of peace proposed by the English commissioners, were the non-interference of the court of Ava with the territories of Kachar, Manipur, and Asam, the cession of the four provinces of Arakan, the payment of two crores of rupees, as an indemnification for the expenses of the war, one to be paid immediately, and the Tenasserim provinces to be retained until the liquidation of the other. The court of Ava was also expected to receive a British resident at the capital, and consent to a commercial treaty, upon principles of liberal intercourse and mutual advantage.

In the discussion of these stipulations, it was evident, notwithstanding the moderate tone of the Burman deputies, and their evident desire for the termination of the war, that the court of Ava was not yet reduced to a full sense of its inferiority, nor prepared to make any sacrifice, either territorial or pecuniary for the restoration of tranquillity. The protection given to fugitives from the Burman territories, was urged in excuse for the conduct of the Burman court, although the actual occurrence of the war was attributed to the malignant designs of evil councillors, who had misrepresented the real state of things, and suppressed the remonstrances addressed by the government of India to that of Ava, thus virtually acknowledging the moderation of the former government. It was also pleaded, that in the interruption of trade and the loss of revenue, the court of Ava had already suffered sufficiently by the war, and that it became a great nation like the English to be contented with the vindication of its name and reputation, and that they could not possibly be less generous than the Chinese, who, on a former occasion, having conquered part of the Burman territory, restored it on the return of peace.

To this it was replied, the Chinese were the vanquished, not the victors, whilst the British were in possession of half the kingdom, the most valuable portion of which they were still willing to relinquish; but that as the war had been wholly unprovoked on their part, they were fully entitled to expect such concessions, in territory and money, as should reimburse them for the expenses they had incurred, and enable them to guard more effectually against any future collision. The manner in which these points were urged satisfying the Woongyees of the firmness of the British commissioners, they at last waived all further objections, and confined themselves to requesting a prolongation of the armistice till the 2nd of November, in order that they might put the court fully in possession of the views of the British negociators, and be empowered to give them a definitive reply. This request was readily acceded to. On the representation of the British General, the Woongyees also pledged themselves that all British and American subjects detained at Ava, should immediately be set at liberty, the British government liberating the Burmas taken on the coast and confined in Bengal. On the day after

this conference the Burman officers dined with the British general, and this intermixture of friendly hospitality with the prosecution of hostilities, whilst it excited their astonishment, taught them a lesson of civilization, which it is to be hoped may not have proved in vain. The Burman character, although not worthy of implicit trust, is far from suspicious, and no feeling of uneasiness or alarm appeared to impair their enjoyment of British hospitality. The parties separated well pleased with each other. Captain Alexander and Brigadier McCreagh accompanied the Kyee Woongyee to near Meaday, and three of the Burman chiefs attended Sir A. Campbell to Prome.

The notion of treating upon a perfect equality, which evidently pervaded the recent negotiations on the part of the Burman commissioners, and which probably originated not only in the haughtiness of the court of Ava, but in an impression entertained by it, to which the acknowledged anxiety of the British authorities for peace had given rise, that they were enabled or disinclined to carry on the war, rendered the ultimate result of the conferences at Naibenzeik little problematical, and arrangements for resuming hostile

operations were actively pursued. Their necessity was soon evinced. The court of Ava, indignant at the idea of conceding an inch of territory, or submitting to what, in oriental politics, is held a mark of excessive humiliation, payment of any pecuniary indemnification, breathed nothing but defiance, and determined instantly to prosecute the war. With more regard to the existing treaty, however, than was to have been expected from the Burman commanders, no operations of a decidedly hostile character was attempted by them; and although, in the end of October, several Burman parties passed the line of demarcation, and pillaged and burnt the villages within the British lines, these outrages were attributable to the difficulty of checking so ill-organised a force, under the immediate expectation of renewed hostilities, rather than to any design of the commanders to violate the terms of a solemn stipulation. In the pause that ensued before hostilities were renewed, Sir Archibald Campbell addressed the Kyee Woongyee, relative to the prisoners, whose liberation was refused on the plea of troops having moved by way of Negrais to Rangoon; and in reply to his inquiry, as to the probable termination of the truce, that chief intimated,

that the demand for any cession of money or territory, precluded all possibility of a friendly intercourse. Nothing remained, therefore, but a further appeal to arms.

The information of the last few weeks, had fully established the assemblage of a very considerable force along the line of the river, between Meaday and Ava, which was gradually drawing towards the British position at Prome. From a direct attack, there was nothing to apprehend, but any serious movement on either flank might have been attended with some inconvenience. In order to oppose an advance on the right, Colonel Pepper was stationed in Old Pegu, whilst it was thought the detachment at Bassein, after the division at Donabew had been withdrawn, would be a sufficient check against any annoyance from this quarter. The chief point, however, was to keep the enemy on the alert in the line of his immediate advance, and draw his attention as much as possible to Prome. Upon the close of the armistice, the state of the country, and the yet incomplete concentration of resources, rendered the forward movement of the whole army impracticable; but Sir A. Campbell lost no time in detaching a force to drive the Bur-

mas back from an advanced position which they occupied at Wattigaon, about twenty miles from Prome. With this view, Colonel Macdowall marched with two brigades of Madras native infantry, to attack the post from the left, and Major Evans, with the 22nd native infantry, was ordered to move upon the front of the position, and attack in concert with the main body, whilst the 18th native infantry was advanced to support the 22nd, if required. The 38th native infantry also was sent round by Saagee, to make a diversion in favour of the assailants. The state of the road did not admit of artillery being attached to either column.

The result of this attempt was disastrous. The main body marched on the evening of the 15th of November. On the morning of the 16th, they encountered the Burmese in great force, who maintained a spirited contest; and, although forced to fall back, kept up a fierce and destructive fire, as they slowly retreated to their works in the rear, which proved to be too strong for the attacking force to carry by storm, and which their want of artillery prevented them from breaching. In attempting, however, to overcome the fire of the enemy, and approach the works, the officers

set their men the example of personal exposure, and, consequently, sustained a severe loss. Colonel Macdowall himself was shot in the head by a musket ball, and four of the junior officers were disabled and carried from the field. Lieutenant-colonel Brooke, who succeeded in the command, finding it impracticable to make any impression on the post, was compelled to order a retreat. This was effected with as much regularity as circumstances would permit, the country being a thick jungle, in which the enemy lurked in great numbers, keeping up a galling fire. After a march of severe fatigue, in which a number of the wounded and exhausted were unavoidably left behind, the detachment came to a nulla, about nine miles from Prome, where the enemy desisted from pursuit, their attention having been diverted by the movements of the other detachments.

Major Evans having marched on the night of the 15th, fell in with the enemy's picquets at daybreak on the following morning. After driving them back, he proceeded to an opening in the jungle, when he was checked by a very heavy fire from a strong stockade, by which the light company, who had preceded the advance, were

almost annihilated, and the men of the other companies struck down in considerable numbers. The firing in the direction of Colonel Macdowall's column had been heard early in the morning, but as no appearance of their co-operation was indicated, and the enemy were in much too great a number for a single regiment to make an impression on them, Major Evans also retreated. The enemy pursued for about three miles, and harassed the rear, but the corps effected its return after a fatiguing march in good order. In this division, as well as Colonel Macdowall's, many of those who fell on the march, through wounds or fatigue, were left behind: the dooly bearers having, at an early stage, thrown down their loads, and fled into the thicket.

The 38th regiment, under colonel Smith, approached Wattigaon, only about twelve o'clock on the 16th, and then fell in with what appeared to be the rear of the enemy, at this time engaged in the pursuit of the main division. On the first appearance of the corps, the Burmese fled, but no traces of the main division being visible, and the firing having ceased, Colonel Smith found it necessary to measure back his course to Prome, which he reached after a fatiguing march, without

encountering any opposition. The loss on this occasion was severe; besides Colonel Macdowall killed, thirteen officers were wounded, of whom Lieutenant Ranken, of the 43rd regiment, subsequently died of his wounds: fifty-three rank and file were killed, and about one hundred and fifty were reported wounded and missing. The principal cause of this disaster appears to have been misinformation as to the enemy's strength, as, instead of two or three thousand, at which their numbers were originally computed, Major Evans estimated those opposed to him to be not fewer than five thousand; whilst those engaged by the main division were reckoned, by Lieutenant-colonel Brooke, at between ten and twelve thousand men. The position was also one of considerable strength, and, from the density of jungle, of difficult access.

The ultimate consequences of this disaster were not unfavourable, as it encouraged the Burman generals in the high opinion they were still rather inclined to entertain, of their own prowess, and induced them to adopt a system of confident warfare, which brought them within the reach of the British commander. Relying on the manifestation of their purpose to attack

him in his position, General Campbell determined to await their advance, and the enemy soon made their appearance round Prome, to the extent it was estimated, of between fifty and sixty thousand men. As, from their numbers, they were spread over a considerable tract of country, they were enabled to detach parties past both flanks of the British position, by which the communication with Rangoon was threatened, and the districts below Prome, on both banks of the river, exposed to the depredation of irregular and marauding bands. The entire command of the river by the British flotilla gave them an important advantage, and on the western bank, a position at Padown-mew was occupied by a small detachment in concert with the river force, and maintained with great spirit against repeated attempts of the enemy to dislodge them: a detachment was also sent out under Lieutenant-colonel Godwin to Shudaun, which cleared the left bank of the river of the enemy for ten miles below Prome, and a party of Burmas having fired upon a division of the 87th, on their way to join the army, the men landed and dispersed the assailants.

After awaiting for some days the expected ap-

proach of the Burman force, General Campbell, finding that they were reluctant to quit the cover of the jungle, and that they continued to harass the country, and disturb the line of communication, determined to make a general attack upon every accessible part of the enemy's line to the east of the Irawadi, which extended from the Napadee hills, a commanding ridge on the bank of the river, to the villages of Simbike and Sembeh inland, about eleven miles to the north-east of Prome. The Burman army was divided into three corps: the right was formed on the western bank of the river; the centre was stationed upon the hills of Theybu, or Napadee, and communicated through a thick forest by a line of posts with the left, which was posted at Simbike, upon the Nawine river, which, running past Prome, fell into the Irawadi. The left was commanded by Maha Nemijo, the centre by the Kyee-Woongyee, and the right by the Sada Woon; the divisions were all strongly stockaded, and occupied positions of difficult approach.

Leaving four regiments of native infantry for the defence of Prome, General Campbell marched early on the morning of the 1st of December against the enemy's left, whilst the flotilla, under

Sir James Brisbane, and the 26th Madras native infantry acting in co-operation, by a cannonade of the works upon the river, diverted the attention of the centre from the real point of attack.

Upon reaching the Nawine river, at the village of Zeouke, the force was divided into two columns. The right, under Brigadier-general Cotton, formed of his Majesty's 41st and 89th regiments and the 18th and 28th native infantry proceeding along the left bank of the river, came in front of the enemy's entrenchments consisting of a series of stockades covered on either flank by thick jungle, and by the river in the rear, and defended by a considerable force, of whom eight thousand were Shans, or people of Laos, under their native chiefs. The post was immediately stormed. The attack was led by Lieutenant-colonel Godwin, with the advanced guard of the right column, and the stockades were carried in less than ten minutes. The enemy left three hundred dead, including their general Maha Nemyo, and all their stores and ammunition and a considerable quantity of arms were taken. The left column, under the Commander-in-chief, composed of his Majesty's 13th, 38th, 47th, and 87th regiments, and 38th Madras

infantry, which had crossed the Nawine river lower down, came up as the fugitives were crossing, and completed the dispersion of the Burman army.

Following up the advantage thus gained, General Campbell determined to attack the Kyee Woongyee in his position without delay. His force accordingly marched back to Zeouke, where they bivouacked for the night, and resumed their march on the following morning at day-break. The nature of the country admitted of no approach to the enemy's defences upon the hills, except in front, and that by a narrow pathway, accessible to but a limited number of men in line. Their posts at the foot of the hills were more readily assailable, and from these they were speedily driven; but the attack of the heights was a more formidable task, as the narrow road by which they were approached, was commanded by the enemy's artillery and breast-works numerously manned. After some impression had been apparently made by the artillery and rockets, the first Bengal brigade, consisting of his Majesty's 13th and 38th regiments, advanced to the storm, supported on the right by six companies of his Majesty's

87th. They made good their ascent in spite of the heavy fire they encountered, and to which scarcely a shot was returned; and when they had gained the summit, they drove the enemy from hill to hill, until they had cleared the whole of the formidable and extensive entrenchments. These brilliant advantages were not gained without loss, and in the affair of the 1st, Lieutenants Sutherland and Gossip, of his Majesty's 41st, and Ensign Campbell, of the royal regiment, were killed, and Lieutenant Proctor, of his Majesty's 38th, Lieutenant Baylee of the 87th, and Captain Dawson, of his Majesty's ship *Arachne*, in that of the 2nd. The division under General Cotton which had made a circuitous march to take the enemy in flank was unable to make its way through the jungle in time to bear part in the engagement. On the 5th, a detachment from it proceeded across the river, and drove the right wing of the enemy not only from their post upon the river, but from a strong stockade about half a mile in the interior, completely manned and mounting guns. The enemy were dispersed with severe loss in killed and prisoners, and their defences were set on fire.

The beneficial results of this action were immediately apparent in the disappearance of the flanking parties of the enemy, and the re-establishment of a free communication along the river; but in order to realise all the advantages to which it was calculated to lead, Sir A. Campbell immediately advanced in pursuit of the retreating army. As it was known that the enemy had fortified the positions along the river from Meaday to Paloh, and had strengthened them with great labour against the direct line of attack, General Campbell determined to move upon them circuitously with one division of his force, so as to turn them as high as Palha, whilst another division proceeded along the river, communicating and co-operating with the flotilla. Of the first division he took the command himself; the second was placed under Brigadier-general Cotton, and the flotilla proceeded under Commodore Brisbane, having on board a military force, commanded by Brigadier Armstrong. General Campbell marched on the 9th of December to Wattigaon: on the 11th the column was detained by a heavy fall of rain, which continued for thirty hours, rendering the roads almost impassable, injuring a considerable quantity of commissariat stores,

and inducing extensive sickness amongst the troops; cholera, in particular, became alarmingly prevalent both in this and General Cotton's division, but luckily was not of long continuance. In consequence of these causes of detention, the column did not reach Palha till the 16th, when it came into communication with the other divisions. The enemy having abandoned Meaday, having been weakened by the prevalence of cholera to a fatal extent amongst them, General Campbell pushed on to Tabboo with the advance, whence he detached the body guard in pursuit, who overtook the Burman rear about five miles beyond Meaday, and made some prisoners. General Campbell fixed his head-quarters at Meaday on the 19th.

The column under General Cotton moved on the 13th December, and on the 16th, approached Palha; but just below that place was stopped by a deep nulla, across which it was necessary to throw a bridge. On the 18th, the division crossed, and encamped at Inggown on the 19th. On the road, the column passed the enemy's stockades below Palha, which, had they been defended, could not have been carried without great loss the stockades extending along rugged and deep

ravines, and being screened by a thick bamboo jungle, so as not to be visible till the road led to within a few yards of them. These defences were, however, abandoned, and the villages everywhere deserted.

The flotilla moved on the morning of the 12th December, and worked up against the current with great labour, but failed to encounter that opposition for which the extraordinary strength of the works along the river had been prepared. The channel of the river being also, in many places, so narrow, as to oblige the boats to pass within two hundred yards of either bank, the passage, if opposed, could not have been forced without sustaining considerable loss. Their defeats, however, early in the month, and the unexpected movement of the main force on the flank of their positions, seem to have disconcerted the Burman commanders, and they precipitately retreated to Melloon on the right bank of the Irawadi. Their losses in the field, and by desertion, had likewise been augmented by the ravages of disease, and the road was strewn with the dying and the dead, or the mangled remains of the Burmese, who had perished in vast numbers on the retreat. At a short distance from Meaday, it

became necessary to halt the European part of the force, owing to a failure in the supply of animal food. Sir A. Campbell, however, moved on with the Madras division towards Melloon. The flotilla also proceeded on its route.

On the 26th of December, General Campbell was met on his march by a flag of truce, with a letter expressing the wish of the Burman commanders to conclude a peace, and proposing that the leaders, on both sides, should meet to determine its conditions. The same officers who were employed on the like duty on a former occasion, Lieutenant-colonel Tidy and Lieutenant Smith, R.N., were deputed to ascertain what arrangement was contemplated by the Woongyees, and, in the meantime, the army continued its march to Patanagoh, opposite to the Burman entrenchments of Melloon. It arrived at Mingeoun on the the 28th, where a letter was received from the Burman general, postponing the meeting till the 24th of January, a delay that was declared inadmissible, and a definitive reply was demanded before sun-set on the 29th, at Patanagoh, where the army arrived, and encamped without molestation. The flotilla also ascended the river, and anchored above the Burman lines, without ex-

periencing any demonstration of hostility; an indication of the sincerity of the Burman commanders. At about a mile to the south, the river which is there much contracted, was entirely commanded by a strong work mounting several guns, which could not have been passed without loss, had any opposition been offered.

In the communications that ensued, Sir A. Campbell was assisted by Mr. Robertson, the Civil Commissioner in Pegu and Ava, who had been appointed to the general superintendence of the civil affairs in the provinces under British authority, and to the conduct, jointly with the Commander-in-Chief, of political intercourse with the court of Ava. Mr. Robertson arrived at Rangoon in October, and joined the army at Prome on the 27th November. Shortly after his arrival, arrangements were made for the civil administration of Rangoon, Bassein, Martaban, and Ye, as well as for the collection of the revenue, from such parts of the country as had not suffered from the desolating system of Burman warfare.

In the train of the commissioner, was a Burman priest, designated as the Raj-gooroo, the spiritual preceptor of royalty, who, with his fol-

lowers had been allowed to return from Bengal. At the breaking out of the war, this person had been travelling, ostensibly, for purposes of devotion, in Hindustan, and after leaving Benares was arrested by the British authority at Lucknow. After being detained some time in Calcutta, he was liberated, and sent back to Rangoon, and he reached Prome in the suite of Mr. Robertson. As the period of his arrival was the eve of important military operations, he was not allowed to proceed immediately on his journey; but, after the defeat of the Kyee Woongyee at Napadee, and the advance of the army to Meaday, he was permitted to continue his route, and was furnished with a private note, expressive of the undiminished readiness of the British officers, to grant peace to the court of Ava upon liberal conditions, which it was expected he would communicate to his master. It seems doubtful if he displayed much anxiety to smooth the way to the restoration of tranquillity, and it is probable that his influence was little felt in any respect. The Burman priests, generally, possess but a slight hold upon the minds of the people, and the personal character of the king rendered it unlikely that he would listen to the councils of the Gooroo.

In the present instance, however, a sufficient interval had not elapsed for the Gooroo's interference to have produced any effect at Ava, although, from the letters of the Burman generals, it appeared that he had been instrumental in inducing them to make their present overture. Kolein Woongyee, who had lately joined the army, had been furnished with authority to enter upon negociations, and had been sent from the court for that purpose. There could be no doubt of the prevailing feeling amongst all ranks of Burmans. The war had long been most unpopular; the best troops of the state had been destroyed or disorganised; the new levies raised to supply their place, were of the worst description, procured at an immense expense, and were thinned by desertion the moment they took the field. Most of the members of the Lotoo, or great council, and the king's own relations, warmly advocated peace, and he was well inclined to listen to their advice. The queen, and the small party of her kindred and adherents, still, however, counselled opposition, and the pride of a barbaric sovereign could ill stoop to make the sacrifices, by which alone tranquillity was to be purchased. The advance of the British army from Napadee seems, however, to

have turned the scale in favour of pacific councils, and Kolein Woongyee was, in consequence, sent from Ava to Melloon, to endeavour to set a treaty on foot. In this he was cordially seconded by the Kyee Woongyee, who, although he continued high in command, and discharged his duties with credit, was, throughout, opposed to the war.

After some unimportant preliminary discussions, it was agreed that Sir A. Campbell, Mr. Robertson, and Sir James Brisbane, whom the British Commissioners solicited to co-operate with them in the pending negociations, should hold a conference with Kolein Menghee and the Kyee Woongyee, on the Irawadi, between Patanagoh and Melloon, in a boat fitted up by the Burmese for that purpose. The first conference took place on the afternoon of the 30th December; each party was accompanied by fifty unarmed attendants, and the conference was public. At the first meeting, the terms were stated generally, and their further discussion postponed till the next day. On this occasion, Kolein Menghee declared, that, besides the general orders issued by the court to make peace, he had lately received particular instructions to that effect, and that his acts were to be considered as those of the king.

On the next day, the Burman commissioners acceded to those terms which were previously proposed as the basis of the treaty, with the addition of the provinces of Ye, Tavai, and Mergui, which were now included amongst the demands for territorial concession. The pecuniary demand was reduced to one crore of rupees.

A third interview, for the purpose of adjusting the payment of the stipulated indemnification, was to have taken place on the 1st of January; but Kolein Menghee being unwell, it was deferred till the 2nd. The Burmese chief requested the aid of an English doctor, and assistant-surgeon Knox was selected, for his conversancy with the language, to wait upon him. On the 2nd, the meeting took place, when the Burman commismisioners endeavoured strenuously to evade the money payment, which they asserted the country was unable to make, and they solicited its remission as an act of charity. They were also very reluctant to concede the province of Arakan, as compromising the national honour; and, with respect to Manipur, they declared that they had no objection to withdraw from all interference with the affairs of that country, although they hesitated to acknowledge Gambhir Singh as the

Raja, as they asserted that the person whom they regarded as the lawful prince was residing under the protection of the court at Ava. Finding, however, the British commissioners could not be induced to deviate from the conditions stipulated, they finally yielded, and Kolein Menghee closed the conference by exclaiming, "Now we shall be excellent friends." The English copy of the treaty was signed on the 2nd, the Burmese on the 3rd of January, and an armistice was agreed upon till the 18th of January, by which period it was expected the treaty would receive the ratification of the king, and would be returned from Ava, and that all prisoners would be delivered up and the payment of the first instalment commenced.

During the conferences, the Burman commissioners repeatedly declared their being furnished with full powers, and their firm persuasion, that whatever they agreed to, the king would ratify; they expressed their entire satisfaction with the spirit in which the negociations had been conducted by the British commissioners, and their gratification at the prospect of a speedy renewal of friendly relations: they made no secret of their motives, and frankly and unreservedly ad-

mitted, that the king had been ruined by the war; that the resources of the country were exhausted; and that the road to Ava was open to the British army. There appeared every reason to credit their assertions, and all who had an opportunity of exercising personal observation were impressed with the conviction, that the negociators were honest.

To the treaty now agreed upon, the Siamese were made a party, as far as regarded the establishment of amicable relations. Although they had taken no part in the war, they had continued their military demonstrations. In December, a letter was received by Captain Fenwick, at Martaban, from the Ron na Ron, announcing that he was on his march towards the Pegu frontier, with a Siamese army, and had moved to Kamboori on his way. It was, accordingly, arranged by the commissioners, that Captain Williamson should be attached to the Siamese, and a letter was addressed to the ministers of Siam, in encouragement of the disposition thus manifested. In the meantime, however, Captain Burney had been despatched by the supreme government to congratulate the king of Siam upon his accession, the former sovereign having expired on the 22nd

of July, 1824. His remains were burnt on the 5th of May, 1825, agreeably to the Siamese custom, which delays the ceremony for about a year from a sovereign's demise. His successor was crowned on the 4th of August, and Captain Burney reached Bangkok on the 4th of December. He found the Siamese court much alive to what was passing in their vicinity, but rather sceptical as to the extent of the advantages gained by the English over the Burmas, and by no means confident of the ultimate termination of the war. Neither was it any part of their policy to take an active share in it, or their wish to contribute to the re-establishment of Pegu, as an independent kingdom. The court of Siam would have been well pleased to have recovered the Tenasserim provinces, which had been wrested from them by the Burman arms, but they hesitated to render the services that might have entitled them to some compensation, not only in the uncertainty of the return they might expect, but in mistrust of their own army, composed as that was, in a great degree, of Peguers, and commanded by a general of Pegu extraction. It was very evident, therefore, that they were by no means in earnest in any intention to co-operate in the war, and

the objects of the envoy were limited to frame a treaty of friendly and commercial intercourse, to adjust some disputes of local importance, and procure the release of the individuals carried into captivity, in which he fully succeeded.

The establishment of the independence of Pegu would have been a serious infliction upon the Burman state, and was well deserved by its procrastinating the war. The measure might have been carried into effect with extreme facility, as the bulk of the inhabitants of the lower provinces were of Pegu, or Talien origin, and were well enough disposed to shake off the heavy yoke of their Burman conquerors. At the same time, there were obvious objections to the arrangement. The people were very much mixed with the Burman race, and their characters indicated neither personal intrepidity nor national spirit, which could have been relied upon as available in undertaking their defence: neither did it appear that any individual of rank or influence existed, round whom the population would have rallied, as the common object of their reverence or attachment. Subsequent events did not invalidate these conclusions, as, in the short-lived insurrection which immediately followed the war, the

Taliens displayed neither steadiness nor valour; and the person who came forward as their leader was an individual who had actively opposed the British, and who derived his importance from his connexion with the royal family of Ava, not Pegu, his sister having been one of the wives of the present king. The only persons of any importance in Pegu were the head men of the villages, who had been all appointed under the Burman rule, and the Ron na Ron, a general in a foreign service, boasted no higher an origin than that of the head man of Martaban, which situation had been held by his father under the Burman government. The burthen of maintaining Pegu in its independence, must, therefore, have fallen entirely upon the British power, and in the difficulty of nominating a ruler, it would, probably, have been compelled to assume the sovereignty, involving an extension of dominion compatible neither with its policy nor advantage. These considerations induced the commissioners to abstain from urging any stipulation to this effect, and to reserve it as an extremity, to which the obstinate perseverance of the court of Ava, in a course of hostility, might compel them to resort.

In the interval that elapsed before the close of

efforts of all concerned in the attack were of the most meritorious description, but to none was the success due in a greater degree than to the artillery and rocket corps, under Lieutenant-colonel Hopkinson and Lieutenant Blake. The precision and rapidity of the practice in both branches, spread destruction and panic through the Burman entrenchments, and paralysing the energies of the defenders, enabled the assailants to reap the fruits of their daring with so comparatively trifling a sacrifice of life.

The original treaty was found in the lines of Melloon, and from this, and from letters ascribed to the Raj-gooroo taken at the same time, it seemed probable, that the Burman commissioners had been playing a treacherous part, and had sought only to protract the war by their negociations for peace, to which they had never intended to obtain the sanction of the king. As far, however, as the Burman commissioners are concerned, subsequent information exonerates them from the imputation of insincerity. A copy of the treaty was sent to Ava. The treaty which they signed was not submitted, for, in the formal execution of it they had rather exceeded their powers, and presumed to anticipate the intentions of their royal master.

Their offer to pay a portion of the instalment, and the discovery of a sum of money in their possession, were further evidences of their integrity, as were their offer to deliver hostages for the release of the European prisoners at Ava, and their actual liberation of Lieutenant Flood, of his Majesty's 12th. There is no reason, therefore, to suspect them of any want of candour, nor is it doubtful, that the court was anxious for peace. The terms of the treaty were however unquestionably very unpalatable, and the cession of Arakan, and the payment of money, most galling to the feelings of the king and those about him. That he should hesitate to give them his acquiescence was not surprising, and those who advocated desperate resistance, taking advantage of this mood, urged him to withhold his final concurrence. Whilst he thus fluctuated, a chief, whose incapcity was only equalled by his presumption, volunteered his services to lead another army against the English, and promised to retrieve the sinking glory of the empire. As a last hope, his offers were accepted, and it was resolved to try once more the fortune of war. The opportunity was not long wanting.

In the meantime, advices of the capture of

pare for either alternative, and refresh his troops after their late fatigues, Sir A. Campbell halted the army for a few days at Pagahm.

Whilst these transactions were taking place on the upper line of the Irawadi, the province of Pegu had been the scene of some military operations, which we may here pause to notice. The force stationed at Pegu, under Colonel Pepper, had been originally intended to act only on the defensive, and to cover the province from the Burman detachments that might be sent out from the main body or the garrison of Tongo, which, with some other fortified posts on the Sitang river, still remained in the possession of the enemy. Encouraged by the absence of molestation, and obtaining in the person of Ujina, the former governor of Martaban, an active and enterprising leader, the Burmas in the end of 1825, became daring and troublesome, and by the acts of pillage and devastation which they committed, occasioned some mischief, and still more alarm. In order to check their incursions therefore Colonel Pepper moved from Pegu on the 23rd December, and marched to Shoe-gein, on the left bank of the Sitang, which he occupied without resistance. Parties of the enemy

showed themselves occasionally in the jungle, but attempted no collective opposition. A party of one hundred and fifty men was posted at Mikow, and Lieutenant-colonel Conry, with the 3rd light infantry, was detached to reduce Sitang the Burman post between Tongo and Martaban.

Lieutenant-colonel Conry reached Sitang on the forenoon of the 7th January, and immediately made his dispositions for the attack, which from the strength of the place and the inadequate number of the attacking force, entirely failed, with the loss of Lieutenant-colonel Conry and Lieutenant Adams killed, Lieutenants Harvey and Power wounded: one native officer and nine privates were killed, and eighteen rank and file wounded.

On receiving news of the repulse, Colonel Pepper moved with a reinforcement of the 12th and 44th regiments of Madras native infantry, the flank companies of the 1st European regiment, and a small detachment of artillery, and at nine in the morning of the 11th of January, reached Sitang. The stockade was found of great extent, built entirely of teak timber: its height was from twelve to fourteen feet, and it was constructed on an eminence which com-

manded every approach: the north face was protected by a creek fordable only at low water. After placing the guns in position, the force advanced to the attack in three columns, the right commanded by Major Home, 12th native infantry, the left by Captain Cursham, 1st European regiment, and the centre by Captain Stedham, 34th local infantry. A simultaneous advance was ordered; on which the creek was forded, and the stockade was attacked and carried in about twenty minutes: the advance was made under a heavy fire from the enemy, and the loss was proportionately severe. Captains Cursham and Stedman were killed. Major Home, Lieutenant Fullerton and Lieutenant Gower were wounded, and the loss in rank and file was fourteen killed and fifty-three wounded.

The number of the enemy was computed at three or four thousand. Three hundred dead bodies were found in the stockade, and their loss was estimated at double that number, many being thrown into the river, or into wells, or carried off. The whole of the defences were destroyed on the morning of the 13th.

Shortly after the reduction of the stockade of Sitang, Colonel Pepper was joined by strong

reinforcements from Rangoon, consisting of four companies of his Majesty's 45th, seven companies of the 1st Madras native infantry, besides details of the 3rd and 34th Madras native infantry, altogether eight hundred strong, by which all apprehensions for the security of the country were dissipated, and the population once more resorted with confidence to their homes and ordinary avocations. The efforts of the enemy were not however relaxed, and in the month of February they made a vigorous attack upon the British post at Mikow, which maintained the communication between Pegu and Shoegein and covered the country between the former and the Sitang river. The attempt was gallantly repulsed by the young officer who commanded the position, Ensign Clark, with a small detachment of the 3rd Madras native infantry. Immediately after the news of the action reached Colonel Pepper, a reinforcement of a hundred rank and file of the 13th regiment, with twenty pioneers, under Captain Leggett, was sent to Mikow, as well as a hundred from Pegu, by which the post was secured against the repetition of a similar attempt. The establishment of peace suspended further operations in Pegu.

No occasion had offered for the further prosecution of hostilities against the Burmas in Arakan or Asam, and those provinces continued in the undisturbed possession of the British authorities. Kachar had been likewise unmolested by any foreign force; but it was not till about this time that Manipur was finally cleared of the enemy. It has been already mentioned, that Gambhir Singh and Lieutenant Pemberton, after reaching Manipur in the beginning of the year, were obliged to return to Sylhet for want of supplies. Being furnished with adequate provisions and arms, the Raja, with Captain Grant and Lieutenant Pemberton, again set off for Manipur with the levy. They quitted Banskandy on the 4th of December, and arrived at the town of Manipur on the 18th. There was no Burman force in the vicinity of the city, but a considerable body of them were stockaded at Tummoo, in the south-east corner of the valley, against which a detachment was sent. Finding, however, that the enemy was too strong for the force sent against them, the commander of the detachment applied for re-inforcements, on which the Raja and Captain Grant immediately marched to his assistance, with the rest of the levy, across the Mirang hills,

into the Burman territory, in which route they passed stockades that had been commenced in the defiles, but abandoned on their unexpected advance: they joined the detachment on the 18th of January. On reconnoitring the stockade, it was found to be of considerable strength and extent; the party were unprovided with artillery, and an attempt to carry it by escalade must have been attended with serious loss. It was ascertained, however, that the water of the stockade was procured from a nullah sixty paces distant, and advantage was promptly taken of this circumstance to cut off the Burmas from their supply.

On the 19th, the Manipur troops effected their advance through a thick jungle, and were not discovered till they had obtained command of the spots whence access to the stream from the stockade was practicable. The enemy on perceiving them opened a heavy fire, but the men, being sheltered by the thicket, suffered little. The Burmas made several spirited sorties to drive them from their positions, as well during the rest of that day, as on the two days succeeding, but they were received with great spirit in a desperate, and, as it appeared, final sortie on the

night of the 21st, when being repulsed with severe loss, they commenced their retreat. They retired in small parties, three or four at a time, and had completely cleared the stockade by the night of the 22nd, when it was taken possession of by the Raja. Four small guns and several jinjals were captured in the stockade, with a quantity of rice, sufficient for two months' supply of the levy. Lieutenant Pemberton joined the force on the morning of the 20th.

Immediately after this success, a detachment of three hundred men was sent forward, who succeeded in capturing a stockade on the right bank of the Ningti river. More than two hundred of the people of Manipur were liberated on this occasion, and many others were rescued from captivity, by flying parties of the levy, the whole of which was advanced to the banks of the Ningti by the 2nd of February, whence a ready road lay before them to the capital of Ava. The restoration of tranquillity, however, arrested their advance, and saved the frontier districts from that retaliation, which a long series of cruelty and oppression exercised by the Burmas in Manipur would, no doubt, have provoked, and would almost have justified.

After halting two or three days at Pagahm, General Campbell resumed his march, which now seemed likely to conduct him to the capital of Ava. There, one feeling alone prevailed, and although various reports were thrown out, at one time, of the intention of the king to defend the city to the last extremity, and at another, to protract the war by flying to the mountains, these purposes, if ever conceived, originated in the anxiety of the moment, and were never seriously entertained. The king and his ministers felt that they were in the power of the British; and their only anxiety was, that the personal dignity and security of the sovereign should not be violated. It was with as much satisfaction as astonishment, therefore, that they learned from Mr. Price, on his return from Ava, that the British commissioners sought to impose no severer terms than those which had been stipulated in the treaty of Melloon. To these there was now no hesitation to accede, although a lurking suspicion was still entertained, that the invaders would not rest satisfied with the conditions they professed to impose. With a mixture of fear and trust, Mr. Price was again despatched to the British camp to signify the consent of the Burman court

to the terms of peace; and Mr. Sandford was now set wholly at liberty, and allowed to accompany the negotiator to rejoin his countrymen. These gentlemen returned to camp on the 13th of February; but as the envoy had brought no official ratification of the treaty, Sir A. Campbell declined suspending his march until it should be received. Mr. Price having returned to Ava to obtain this ramification, the army advanced to Yandabo, within four days' march of Ava when the negociator, accompanied by the Burman commissioners, a chief Woongyee, and an Atwenwoon, attended by other functionaries, again made his appearance, with the ratified treaty, and the amount of the first instalment, or twenty-five lacs, in gold and silver bullion. By this treaty, the Burman government engaged to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Asam, Kachar, and Jyntea, to recognise Gambhir Singh as Rajah of Manipur, to receive a British resident at Ava, and depute a Burman resident to Calcutta, to concur in a commercial treaty, to cede, in perpetuity, the four provinces of Arakan, as divided from Ava by the Anupectumien mountains, and the provinces Yeh, Tavai, and Mergui to the south of the Sanluen or Martaban river,

and to pay a crore of rupees, in four instalments, until the receipt of the second, of which Rangoon was to remain in the occupation of the British.

The treaty was concluded on the 24th February, 1826; on the 26th a deputation, consisting of Captain Lumsden of the horse artillery, Lieutenant Havelock, deputy assistant adjutant-general, and assistant-surgeon Knox, were sent on a complimentary mission to the capital with conciliatory presents, which might be interpreted by the wounded pride of the court as a profession of inferiority. After a passage purposely protracted, the delegates arrived at Ava, and on the 1st of March were presented to the sovereign at a public audience. The ceremonial was not without dignity, but it was formal and cold, and no direct communication was vouchsafed by the king: refreshments were placed before the officers, some trifling presents were interchanged, and honorary Burman titles conferred upon the members of the deputation, and the king withdrew. Early on the 3rd, the deputation returned to the camp; on the 7th, the Commander-in-Chief with the first brigade, embarked in boats from Yandabo and proceeded down the river to Rangoon, where General Campbell arrived on the

24th of March. The rest of the army followed in boats of various kinds and sizes, provided by the Burmas; as soon as they arrived they were embarked on board the transports waiting for them, and by the end of the month, the whole force was on its way to the Presidencies to which the respective divisions belonged, with exception of the detachment left to occupy Rangoon, until the payment of the second instalment. A regiment of Madras native infantry, the 18th, with the elephants and details of pioneers, was sent with the constrained concurrence of the Burman functionaries by land to Arakan, with the view of determining the practicability of the route. The detachment marched from Yandabo on the 6th of March, and crossed the Irawadi at Pakangyeh on the 14th. On the evening of the 15th, the march was resumed through the town of Sembewgewn, about four miles from the right bank of the river, and continued on the following day by an excellent road to Chalain-mew, an extensive walled town, the capital of the province of Chalain, one of the most populous and fertile divisions of the kingdom. A road from hence lay across the mountains to Talak, but it was reported to be difficult for cattle and to be ill

provided with water. The division, therefore, proceeded more directly southwards, and in three days more halted at Kwensa on the Mine river, two miles beyond which the ascent over the boundary mountains commenced: two days more of gradual ascent brought the force to Napehmew the last Burman town towards the mountains; from hence the road was more precipitous and rugged, chiefly in the bed of the Mine river, and presenting occasionally narrow and defensible defiles, but by no means impracticable: two days more reached the summit of the pass; the boundary between Ava and Arakan, and completely commanding the ascent from either territory. From hence an excellent road, the work of the last Burman sovereign, led down to Aeng in Arakan, where the division arrived in three days more, or on the 26th of March, having thus determined two important points, the knowledge of a tract equally well adapted for defensive or offensive warfare by the establishment of an impregnable barrier on the top of the pass, or the practicable march across the mountain of an invading force, into the most fertile and healthy of the provinces of Ava, within an easy distance of the capital.

After a short visit to Calcutta, and personal communication with the government, Sir Archibald Campbell returned to Rangoon as chief commissioner, to receive the second instalment of the stipulated payment, and to determine finally the boundary to be established to the southward, which, agreeably to the terms of the treaty, was to be the Sanluen river. Mr. Crawfurd, who had been associated with him as civil commissioner, had proceeded to the Sanluen at the end of March, and laid the foundation of a new town at the mouth of the river, to which the name of Amherst was assigned, but which was afterwards moved about twenty-five miles higher up, to a more salubrious situation, and has since risen into a place of some consideration, as Moulmain, the capital of the Tenasserim provinces. The realisation of the second instalment was not effected before the month of October, shortly after which Sir Archibald Campbell, with the remainder of the troops, departed to Moulmain. Mr. Crawfurd in the meanwhile was appointed envoy to the court of Ava, to discuss with the ministers in person such arrangements as seemed to require explanation, and to conclude the terms of a treaty for a more secure and advantageous commercial intercourse

with Rangoon than had heretofore prevailed. The mission left Rangoon in September, and returned there by the middle of January, 1827, having effected the object for which it had been sent to Ava. The commissioner and his suite then followed the senior commissioner to the Sanluen; and all personal intercourse with the Burman government was suspended for a season.

Thus terminated a war, which had inflicted very severe penalties on both the belligerent parties: on the British, by a heavy pecuniary expenditure and awful loss of life; and on the Burman empire, by an equal sacrifice of men and money, and by the perpetual separation of some of its most highly-valued dependencies. The expense of the military operations had greatly exceeded all anticipation, and had been, in some respects, unnecessarily wasteful, especially in the instances of the armaments in Kachar and Arakan, which were wholly disproportioned to the opposition to be overcome or the objects to be accomplished. A large portion of the expenditure, however, arose out of misinformation with regard to the resources of the Burman kingdom, which, instead of being adequate to the support of the troops, proved to be wholly deficient; and the

army was consequently entirely dependent upon supplies from Bengal and Madras, which had to be conveyed by sea, by a tedious and most expensive transit. The cost of the war, has, however, been over-rated; and, judging from the published accounts of 1824—1827, it probably did not exceed five or six crores of rupees, or five millions sterling. The loss of life was a more serious consideration. The mortality amongst the native troops in Ava and Arakan is illustrated in the notes annexed to these pages. For that of his Majesty's regiments, we have the authentic documents of the army medical department, presented to Parliament in 1841. From these, it appears that, within the first eleven months after landing at Rangoon, nearly one-half the Europeans died; and that a similar rate of loss occurred in the subsequent operations at Prome and to the northwards. In like manner, in Arakan, at least three-fourths of the European force perished, and of those who survived few were again fit for service. Altogether the deaths nearly equalled the number of British troops originally employed; so that, but for the reinforcements which from time to time arrived, the whole would have been annihilated.[14]

Of the loss thus sustained the casualties in action although numerically small, yet bear a very large ratio to the invading force, being nearly equal to that suffered in the peninsular war, the latter being about four, the former about three and a-half per cent. The proportionate loss by disease was infinitely greater. In Arakan the mortality was attributable entirely to climate, for there the campaign was short, the supplies were sufficient, and the troops but little exposed. In Burma the climate was comparatively innocuous, for all prior and subsequent experience have established the superior salubrity of Rangoon and the Tenasserim provinces to other parts of India within the tropics.[15] At the same time the season of the year is to be taken into account, and the severity of the exposure which the troops underwent. Their being repeatedly in the field during tropical rain, their daily marching through inundated fields, and their bivouacking unsheltered amidst mud and water, were trials to which no European constitutions could be subjected with impunity, and when to this cause of sickness was added unwholesome and insufficient food, it need not be matter of surprise that fevers and disorders of the

digestive organs should have remorselessly mowed down the ranks of the British force in Ava. In the words of Major Tulloch's report, however, we may conclude "that a useful lesson may at least be learnt in the event of future warfare in the Burman country as to the necessity for commencing operations at the season best fitted for taking the field, and of being provided with the means of proceeding rapidly through the delta of the Irawadi, to the vicinity of the capital, where military operations can be carried on by Europeans without that injury to health and constitution which for a time paralyses their efforts in the lower division of the empire. With these precautions and a due attention to the troops being made independent of local resources for their supplies, it may be anticipated that a very moderate force of Europeans would be able to accomplish what on this occasion employed at Rangoon and Arakan the combined efforts of twenty thousand men; of whom not more than a tenth part could ultimately be brought into the field in the actions which decided the fate of the empire."

The policy of maintaining a friendly intercourse with the government of Burmah, consequently upon the restoration of tranquillity, which it was one of the objects of the treaty of Yandabo to accomplish was never more than partially successful, and was finally disappointed by the determined disinclination of the Burman sovereign. A brief notice of the circumstances of the failure, and of the changes which the monarchy has undergone down to the most recent date, seems essential therefore to complete the narrative, by furnishing a general view of the consequences of the war, and the relations which have hitherto subsisted between the two states.

The manner in which the mission of Mr. Crawfurd, at the end of 1826, was received at Ava, offered little encouragement for the appointment of a successor, and his official report to the government of India dissuaded the enforcement of the article of the treaty which provided for the permanent presence of a British envoy at the Burman capital. The Indian government hesitated accordingly to despatch a representative, and it was not until the end of 1829, when some delay in the payment of the instalments of the contribution due, and some questions relating

to the boundaries between the two states, were thought to require the personal interference of an accredited agent, that an officer was again nominated to the duty. Lieutenant-colonel Burney who had recently returned from a special mission to Siam was then sent to Ava, and continued to reside there for several years. Although not exempt from petty annoyances, and having constantly to contend against the caprice of the king, and the insincerity of the ministers, his intercourse with the authorities was, upon the whole, of a friendly nature; and, whilst he enforced the full liquidation of the contribution, which was finally paid off in 1832, and advocated the just claims of European and other traders agreeably to the terms of the commercial treaty, he supported the equitable pretensions of the Burman government, and reclaimed for them a valuable tract, the Kubo valley, which it had been proposed to annex to Manipur. He also obtained permission from the court for the passage of several British officers through various parts of the country which had never before been traversed by Europeans, a concession of which the value is to be estimated only by a knowledge of the suspicious jealousies with

which all such journeys are regarded by an uncivilised administration. As long as the government was undisturbed, the presence of Lieutenant-colonel Burney at Ava had come to be looked upon almost with friendly sentiments, when a revolution in the state altered the position of the resident.

The king of Ava, who had for some time fallen into a state of imbecility, and even of occasional insanity, being utterly incompetent to the conduct of affairs, the administration had been assumed by his favourite queen with the support of her brother Menthagyee, to the total exclusion of the heir-apparent and the brothers of the king from all offices of trust and emolument, which were made over to their own adherents and partisans. The resentment inspired by this treatment in the royal relatives was shared by many of the old officers of the crown; and the court was for several years a scene of intrigue and dissension.

Towards the end of 1837, the parties came to an open rupture. It was known that the prince of Tharawadi, the king's eldest brother, was collecting men and arms in the city; and a feeble and unsuccessful attempt was made to

seize his person. He escaped across the Irawadi to Tsagain on the opposite bank, where he was soon joined by so many adherents that he was able to defy the force of his adversaries, and to proclaim his determination to put an end to their power. His quarrel he declared was with Menthagyee alone; and he asserted that he had no intention or desire to injure his brother the king, or his nephew the rightful heir to the throne; and these assertions he confirmed by a solemn oath, taken publicly in a celebrated temple at Tsagain, in the presence of the priests and the people. Notwithstanding the strength of his party, however, he thought it advisable to withdraw from the immediate proximity of Ava, and retired to Mouttshobo about fifty miles off. There the people flocked round his standard: forces were sent against him, but they proved cowardly or disaffected, and many deserted to him; and the few who were well-disposed to the government, either fled or remained inactive. The ministers were equally intimidated; and no adequate measures were adopted to place the capital in a state of defence. There was nothing to prevent Tharawadi's occupation of the city.

In this situation Menthagyee and his colleagues had recourse to the British resident; and at their

earnest solicitation, and in the hope of preventing the scenes of havoc and bloodshed which would follow the forcible entry of the insurgents, Colonel Burney consented to interpose, although convinced that the period had been suffered to pass when his interposition might have exercised some influence. He repaired to the head quarters of Tharawadi, by whom he was received with respect, but who refused to accede to any terms of accommodation. All that could be obtained from him was the issue of orders to the commanders of his troops, that they should consider the resident and all persons connected with him as his friends, and should carefully respect the residency in the event of having to storm the town. With regard to the king and the ministers, he was also induced to promise that if they would allow his followers to enter the city without opposition, he would offer no injury to his brother or any of his ministers, would not put a single soul to death, and would not suffer the inhabitants to be molested or plundered by his troops. He engaged also to suspend his advance towards Ava until he should learn from the resident the king's acceptance of the conditions.

Knowing how little reliance is to be placed on

Burman veracity, the resident, on his return, strongly urged the king to take the opportunity of making his escape and taking refuge at Rangoon. The king was inclined to follow this advice, but his ministers considered that it would be preferable to accede to prince Tharawadi's terms. This determination having been communicated to him, his forces marched upon Ava, plundering, burning, and destroying everything on their route, and assuming so threatening an attitude that the king and the ministers, apprehending treachery, took measures for defending the city. A renewed application was made to the prince, who, equally suspicious of the designs of his opponents, had not yet quitted his head quarters at Mouttshobo, and he repeated the pledge he had before given, but required, as a proof that no treachery was intended—that the prince Bo-woon his half brother, the queen's brother, Menthagyee, and several of the king's chief ministers and generals, should be surrendered as hostages to his son, Thait-leng-byn, who was encamped at Tsagain directly opposite to the city. Seeing the hopelessness of resistance, the persons indicated, thirteen in number, went over and delivered themselves up to Thait-

leng-byn on the 7th of April. They were accompanied by the resident, who made the strongest appeal to the young prince to treat them in conformity with the pledge which his father had so repeatedly given. How little intention to adhere to his promises was entertained, was very soon made manifest.

On the morning of the 9th of April, Tharawadi ordered the hostages with exception of the Prince Bo-woon to be put in irons and confined in the common jail of Ava, and at the same time sent his son with two thousand men to take possession of the palace, which became the scene of plunder and cruelty. The principal officers were seized and imprisoned, their houses pillaged, and their families were insulted, robbed and then beaten and tortured to make them disclose where they had concealed their treasures. The queen and her daughter were separated from the king, and all their jewels and property taken from them, and the king himself was treated with indignity. Tharawadi having entered the city, was waited upon by the resident, who remonstrated with him in vain on his violation of his promises. Tharawadi, who had assumed the title of king of Mouttshobo, asserted that he had never promised

not to punish any of his brother's officers who could be proved guilty of crime, and at all events had made no promise in writing. The meanness of this evasion was pointed out firmly but respectfully by the resident but to no purpose, and in the course of a few days, notwithstanding Colonel Burney's interference both personally with the new king and through the medium of his most influential advisers, a number of those of whose persons Tharawadi had obtained possession were put to death by his orders, being either secretly strangled in prison, or publicly executed with those circumstances of atrocious inhumanity which characterise the capital punishments of the Burmas.

The conduct of Tharawadi, who was intoxicated by his success, in thus violating his most solemn promises to the resident, and his utter disregard of the remonstrances of the latter was only part of a policy of which he made no secret—his determination to get rid of the residency altogether. He not only declared in council, but explicitly stated to the resident that he did not consider himself bound by the acts of his predecessor, and that he did not acknowledge the treaties made by his brother with the government of India, replying to the argument that the treaties made with

the British government were not personal with the late king but perpetual with the Burmese nation by whomsoever governed, by saying, that such might be the English custom; it was not the Burmese; that the Burmese officers had been frightened into signing the treaty of Yandabo; that it contained everything for the English and nothing for the Burmese; that the late government had never shown him the whole of it, and that at all events the English had not conquered him, or made the treaty with him, and that he was determined to have nothing to say to it. These declarations made publicly on several occasions, the loss of all personal influence with the king, and the resident's repugnance to appear even to countenance by his presence the acts of violence and barbarity which were daily perpetrated, induced him at last to apply for permission to withdraw from Ava to Rangoon, on the plea of impaired health, having reported to the government of India, the state of affairs, and purporting to await instructions at Rangoon. This was exactly what Tharawadi desired, who took great credit to himself for having effected the removal of the resident without adopting any of those violent proceedings for the purpose to which he had been

repeatedly urged by many of his adherents. Colonel Burney accordingly quitted Ava on the 17th of June, 1837, accompanied by the European traders and American missionaries who had been established there and who found they could not remain with safety; Tharawadi having removed on the 10th of the month the capital to Kyung-myung, carrying with him his whole court and a large portion of the inhabitants, having expressed his determination to make Ava a heap of ruins, and having forbidden any of the Europeans or Americans to accompany him to his new capital. The resident and his party arrived at Rangoon on the 6th of July after a tedious and troublesome passage, in which they experienced much incivility from the Burman functionaries, though not from the people when the latter ventured to communicate with the boats of the resident and his train.

Conceiving apparently that Colonel Burney had attached more weight to the expressions of the new king than they deserved as having been uttered in moments of irritation and intemperance, and unwilling to appear inclined to take any part in the internal revolutions of the Burman state; thinking it also still possible that amicable rela-

tions might be restored by a conciliatory course of conduct, and very reluctant to be involved in a dispute in this quarter, whilst its utmost exertions were called for beyond the Indus; the government of Bengal resolved, on Colonel Burney's departure for Europe to endeavour to replace him at the Burman court by a representative who might be more acceptable to Tharawadi. Colonel Benson was therefore despatched to Rangoon, having as his assistant Captain M'Leod, who had been before in Ava, was personally known to the king and his ministers, and was well acquainted with the Burman language and manners.

The experiment thus made was not successful: at first Colonel Benson was received with some show of civility at Rangoon, where he arrived in July, 1838, but it was with some difficulty that he procured the means of proceeding to his ulterior destination, and was unable to depart until the end of August. Inattention and insufficiency of supplies accompanied his whole passage, and an intimation met him at Prome that he would do well to remain there: disregarding this notice as it was in some degree unofficial, he resumed his route, and in October arrived at Amerapura to which Tharawadi had removed

his irksome position in the beginning of 1839, and returned to Calcutta. Captain M'Leod whom he left behind, was for a time rather better treated: he was admitted to an interview with Tharawadi, but this was consequent upon the occurrence of a very severe earthquake at Amerapura, when the king's superstitious apprehensions and his curiosity to know how Europeans accounted for such phenomena, overcame his reluctance to admit Captain M'Leod to his presence even in his private character. He still refused to acknowledge him in any public capacity, the interdict against communicating with the people was not removed, and the mission was not allowed to transfer its residence from the islet, where with the setting in of the rains it ran some risk of being washed away, as the bank was under water. Captain M'Leod was, therefore, compelled to follow the example of his superior, and to the infinite diversion of the usurper, the mission returned to Rangoon, and there passed the remainder of the year, when the continued neglect and insolence of the Burman authorities having satisfied the Bengal government, that any further attempt at conciliation was an idle compromise of its dignity, it was finally withdrawn. No effort has

which he came attended by a numerous and warlike train, which it was anticipated would be directed against Arakan or Tenasserim. The apprehension was groundless, although arrangements were prudently adopted for strengthening the forces in these quarters. After laying the foundation of a new town in the vicinity of Rangoon which was not completed, and paying a visit to Pegu, Tharawadi quitted Rangoon in January, 1842, and returned to Amerapura. Although averse to the British alliance, and steadily anxious to vindicate the honour of the Burman arms, and recover the lost provinces of the empire, it does not appear that Tharawadi ever seriously meditated a renewal of hostilities. However stained with the vices of his country and his station; however violent and sanguinary, he was evidently a man of observation and sagacity, and was well aware of the inferiority of his means to cope with the military resources of the Indian government. There was no difficulty in remaining at peace with him: he was little inclined to provoke a war: as notwithstanding his severity, he felt his power insecure, and eventually fell a victim to the spirit of insubordination of which he had set the example.

Towards the end of 1845, Tharawadi resolved to announce his legitimate son as his successor, and, to strengthen his claim by his marriage with the daughter of the old king, his brother. The measure was opposed by his eldest son, the prince of Prome, who raised an insurrection against his father. The prince was defeated, taken, and, after some short time, put to death. But Tharawadi, who had always been addicted to intemperate habits, became so ferocious in his cruelty, that his own ministers found it necessary to deprive him of power and treat him as insane, raising the young prince to the chief authority, with the title of regent. Tharawadi died in confinement a few months after his deposal; but the regent refrained from assuming the royal title until after the death of the old king, which did not occur until the beginning of 1847. His nephew then became sovereign. In the commencement of his reign hopes were entertained that the intercourse with the court of Ava might be renewed on the terms of the treaty, as some disposition was shown to relax the restrictions to which, during the life of Tharawadi, the resort of Europeans to the capital and the trade of Rangoon had been rigorously subjected. The new

prince, however, speedily subsided into inactivity and sensual indulgence, and experienced the fate of his father, having been deposed by one of the ministers, who placed himself upon the throne. The particulars of this last revolution are yet imperfectly known in Europe; but the character of the usurper is described as in no way superior to the princes whom he has succeeded in energy or information: whether he will persevere in provoking a renewed contest with the British power in India remains yet undecided. The result cannot be doubtful. The application of the powers of steam—the advantages available from the proximity and abundant resources of the flourishing provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim,[16] and, above all, the knowledge that should have been gained by the experience of the war, which has been described in the preceding pages, afford reasonable certainty that, should a contest be unavoidable, it will be brought to a speedy and honourable termination without any disproportionate sacrifice of life or treasure.

NOTES.

1.—p. 3.) On these subjects, Dalrymple's Repertory furnishes some characteristic details.—Vol. i. pp. 151 and 391.

(2.—p. 3.) Of this transaction, Dr Hamilton remarks, "The opinion that prevailed, both in Chittagong and at Ava, was, that the refugees were given up from fear; and this opinion has, no doubt, continued to operate on the ill-informed court of Ava, and has occasioned a frequent repetition of violence and insolence, ending in open war. The consequence of this will, no doubt, be fatal to Ava, but may produce subsequent difficulties to the government of Bengal. These evils might possibly have been avoided by a vigorous repulse of the invasion in 1794, and a positive refusal to hearken to any prososal for giving up the insurgents, after the court of Ava had adopted hostile measures in place of negociation, to which alone it was entitled. *Account of the frontier between the southern part of Bengal and Ava.—Edinburgh Journal of Science.*

(3.—p. 3.) Symes's Mission to Ava, 8vo, vol. i. p. 275. See also Cox's Burman Empire.

(4.—p. 4.) He is always called by European writers Kingberring, but his proper appellation was *Khyen-bran*, being born after his father's return (*bran*) from a visit to the mountain tribe, named *Khyen*.

(5.—p. 6) He died, April, 1815. See the Parlia-

mentary Papers, printed by order of the House of Commons, 1825. Further details will be found in the supplementary volume to Mills's History, vol. iii. p. 10.

(6.—p. 9.) Public Letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors, of the 20th of December, 1817.

(7.—p. 10.) "A desultory conversation then took place, in which the Woonghees, Woondoks, and others indifferently joined. One advanced, that Chittagong, Luckipore, Dacca, and the whole of the Casimbazar island, formerly made part of the ancient dominions of Arakan, that the remains of chokeys and pagodas were still to be seen near Dacca, and that they would further prove it from the Arakan records, and hinted, that his Majesty would claim the restitution of those countries. Cox's Burman Empire, p. 300. The Woondok again brought forward his Majesty's claims on the ancient territory of Arakan, and reduced it to the form of a demand of half the revenues of Dacca. p. 302. The Woondok renewed the subject of the Burman claims on Dacca, &c., but lowered the demand to one-tenth of the revenues. He said it was evident we were dubious of our right, by Captain Symes having so strenuously urged the building of a chokey on the Naaf, to mark that river as the boundary between the two countries. Had the Naaf been the proper boundary, there was no occasion for Captain Symes's agitating the subject: we had betrayed our consciousness of our want of right by his solicitude on that occasion. They have publicly said, that three thousand men would be sufficient to wrest from us the provinces they claim. P. 304. So little change did nearly thirty years effect in the ideas of the Burman court.

(8.—p. 30.) The pretensions of Burma to the territories claimed in Bengal were of old date, and were repeatedly urged on Captain Cox, as stated in the preceding note, when at Amerapura in 1797. At the same time the

[illegible]

skilled in the use of the sword and spear. If they once fight with us, and we have an opportunity of manifesting

our bravery. it will be an example to the black nations, which are now slaves to the English, and will encourage them to throw off the yoke." A prediction was also current that the heir apparent, a boy of about eleven years of age, when arrived at manhood, would rule over the country of the strangers.—Documents, Burmese War, pp. 223, 229.

(9.—p. 33.) In the beginning of this year the Bengal Regiments which had formerly comprised two battalions were reorganised, each batallion being numbered as a distinct regiment: both numbers are given in the text as there might otherwise be a difficulty in identifying the corps.

(10.—p. 64.) During the dry months of January, February, March, and April, the waters of the Irawadi subside into a stream that is barely navigable: frequent shoals, and banks of sand retard boats of burthen, and a northerly wind invariably prevails. *Symes*, i. 24. In the months of June, July, and August, the navigation of the river would be impracticable, were it not counteracted by the strength of the south-west monsoon: assisted by this wind, and cautiously keeping within the eddies of the banks, the Burmas use their sails, and make a more expeditious passage at this, than at any other season of the year. *Ibid.* i. 128. The internal trade from Bassein was said also to be carried on in boats of large size chiefly, which assembled about the end of April, ready to take advantage of the rise of the river, and the prevailing winds from the south.—*Account of Bassein.* Captain Canning who had been employed on a mission to Ava also advocated the adoption of this plan which he further recommended by assurance that abundant supplies would be procurable at this season.

(11.—p. 87.) A correct notion of the extent of the prevailing sickness, may be formed from the following statement of a competent observer. "During June, July, August, September, and October, the average monthly admissions

into hospital from the artillery, was sixty-five Europeans, and sixty-two natives, being nearly one-third of the greatest numerical strength of the former, and one-fourth of the latter; and large as was this number, I am assured, that it was considerably less, in proportion, than that which was exhibited by any European regiment, in either division of the army. The aggregate number in hospital, during the whole fourteen months, to which this account is limited, was six hundred and five Europeans, and six hundred and eighty-seven natives, a large proportion being made up of re-admission for dysentery. Of the former, forty-nine died, including twelve, who died in the field hospitals of Rangoon and Mergui, or a fraction less than one in twelve and a half. Amongst the latter, thirty-four deaths occurred, or something less than one in twenty. On the setting in of the cold season, the general sickness began to decline, and from January to July, 1825, it was comparatively moderate."—On the diseases prevailing amongst the British troops at Rangoon. By G. Waddell, M. D., Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta, Vol. III.

(12.—p. 102.) Although the Burman form of government is an absolute despotism, the king is aided in his administration by two councils, a public and a privy council; the first consists of four members, entitled wung-yees, properly written wun-kri; wun meaning literally a burthen, in this case denoting an office of importance: the members of this council are considered competent to the discharge of all responsible duties, whether civil or military, so are their deputies or wun-doks, of whom also there are four, and the council is completed by eight saradhaugyis or secretaries. The privy council consists also of four members, styled atwen-wens, or inside officers, being the private advisers of the king. They have their secretaries or kandauthans. The governor of a province is styled myo-wun, and his

deputy ke-wun; while the head of a township is a myothugyi. All these and all other public officers are expected to discharge military, as well as fiscal and judicial duties, and the whole male adult population of the country is liable to conscription.—Crawfurd's Embassy to Ava, p. 395.

(13.—p. 163.) On this subject, we are able to cite the most authentic testimony, in the following extracts from the Transactions of the Medical and Physical Society of Calcutta:—"The causes of this sickness were too obvious to be overlooked: the locality was sufficient to satisfy every medical observer that troops could not inhabit it with impunity, and a reference to the meteorological register will show a severity of season to which the men were quite unaccustomed, and which no covering could wholly resist. Exposure to the weather, which no precaution could prevent, and intoxication, which European soldiers are unfortunately too prone to, had their share in producing disease, but a still greater in pre-disposing to, or rendering more violent the endemic, with which nearly every one was visited in a greater or less degree."—Sketch of the Medical Topography of Arakan by R. N. Burnard. "In a country like Arakan, and in cantonments, such as have been described, it seems not difficult to trace the causes of disease; and after what has been advanced regarding the influence of a raw, variable, and impure atmosphere, little remains to be said, either of the causes of the sickness, or of the mortality which followed it. But it is the opinion of some, that the sickness of the south-eastern division of the army arose, not from the unwholesomeness of the climate, but owed its origin to the bad quality of the supplies. That the provisions were occasionally bad, and that the army suffered from the want of many little comforts which such a situation required, may be admitted, but that the great mortality in Arakan

owed its origin to this source is a conclusion of which there is no proof."—On the sickness prevailing in Arakan, by J. Stevenson. In further proof, that the sickness arose from climate, Mr. Stevenson cites the different fate of the two detachments sent against Talak and Ramree; both were supplied from the same stores; but the former, who, on their return, had to travel through jungle and marsh after the rains had set in, almost all fell ill of fever and died. The latter, who spent about six weeks at sea, had only two deaths, one from fever, and the other from dysentry, and it was observed, that the men who composed the detachment resisted the influence of the climate after their return much better than those who remained behind. The detachment of Europeans and sipahis stationed at Sandoway preserved their health during the rains. From tables included in Mr. Burnard's paper, it appears that the European force amounting to above one thousand five hundred men, lost, between May and September, two hundred and fifty-nine; and at the end of the latter month, had nearly four hundred in hospital. During the same time, ten native corps, the strength of which was nearly eight thousand, lost eight hundred and ninety-two, and had three thousand six hundred and forty-eight in hospital. It appears, also, that during July, August and September, the thermometer ranged from 92° 8 to 78 , and the fall of rain was a hundred and twenty three inches, of which a hundred and three fell in the two first months.

(14.—p. 262.) The whole number of British troops that landed at Rangoon in the first instance comprising the 13th 38th, 41st, 49th, 45th, and 87th was exclusive of officers, 3586; the number of reinforcements does not appear, but that of the deaths was 3115, of which not more than 150 occurred in action, or from wounds. Of about 150 officers sixteen were killed in action or in consequence of their

wounds, and forty-five died of disease. In Arakan the loss in action was none, but of the average strength of the two regiments, the 44th and 54th, amounting to 1004 men, 595 died in the country in the course of eight months, and of those who quitted it not more than a half were alive at the end of twelve months."—Report on the Sickness and Mortality among Her Majesty's Troops serving in the Burmese Empire, from the Records of the Army Medical Department, &c. By Major Alex. M'Tulloch. Presented to both Houses of Parliament, by Command of Her Majesty, August, 1841.

(15.—p. 263.) During eight years the deaths amongst the Queen's troops at Moelmain did not exceed annually thirty-three per thousand; those in the Company's artillery there averaged only twenty-nine. At Tavoy and Mergui the deaths of a small detachment of her Majesty's troops during several years did not exceed one per cent, being a lower ratio than even in the United Kingdom.—Statistics of Sickness and Mortality of Her Majesty's Troops in the Tenasserim Provinces, &c.

(16.—p. 288.) When these countries were first taken possession of in 1826, they were almost depopulated, and were so unproductive, that it was seriously deliberated whether they were worth retaining; and it was proposed to restore them to Burma. Fortunately for the people, the proposal was overruled; and, although their advancement was somewhat retarded by errors of management when first placed under British rule, the result has established, beyond question, the benefits they have derived from the change of rulers. By the last returns, the population of Moulmain, which consisted originally of a few fishing huts alone, exceeded 50,000, comprising a number of enterprising European merchants. The value of the imports and exports in 1850-51 was nearly £600,000. The revenues of the Tenasserim

provinces, which were originally next to nothing, amounted in 1848-49 to £55,000. The population of the country is still yet thinly scattered, and the resources of the province are far from developed. In Arakan the progress has been still more remarkable the population was rated on the 1st January, 1850, at 344,914, of whom only two hundred were Europeans. In 1828 it was estimated at less than one-third, or about 100,000 The revenue of 1850-51 amounted to £88,000, and more than covered the expenses. The trade of Akyab, the principal port, was, in the same year, of the value of £360,000, of which £153,123 was the value of the rice exported Arakan having become the granary of the countries along the Bay of Bengal, and being capable of supplying them to an incalculable extent. Such have been the effects of a mild and equitable, although a foreign government, in the short interval of twenty-six years.

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